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Work Assignment Disputes Under Section 10 (k):
Putting the Substantive Cart
Before the Procedural Horse
Mack A. Player*
The history of the American trade union movement is replete

with examples of disruptive disputes between groups of working men
over the right to perform particular jobs.'

Since the dividing line be-

tween many trades is not sharply defined, competing unions' claims
of exclusive craft jurisdiction or "job ownership" often clash. 2 The
creation and elimination of jobs that accompany technology's impact
on industry further exacerbates labor's fratricidal tendencies. In the
flux and growth of the American economy some trade unions, follow-

ing a natural survival instinct, strive to expand their influence by
imperialistically asserting jurisdiction to the outermost limits. They
claim as many jobs as possible irrespective of historical or craft lines.

In this atmosphere even the least aggressive and most stable crafts
must fight to protect their home ground against predatory or desperate encroachments.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B.,
Drury College, 1963; J.D., University of Missouri, 1965; LL.M., George Washington,
1972.
1. K. STRAND, JURISDICTIONAL DisiUs IN CONSTRUCTION: THE CAUSES, THE
JoINT BOARD AND THE N.L.R.B. 61 (1961); O'Donoghue, JurisdictionalDisputes in the

Construction Industry Since CBS, 52 GEO. LJ. 314, 317 (1964); Sussman, Section
10(k): Mandate for Change?, 47 B.U.L. REv. 201, 202 (1967). For examples of some
infamous disputes see Jaffe, Inter-Union Disputes in Search of a Forum, 49 YALE LJ.
424 (1940).
2. K. STRAND, supra note 1, at 30. For an analysis of "job ownership" and its
psychological basis see N. WHITNEY, JURISDICTION IN AMERICAN BUILDING-TRADES

UNIONS (32 Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Hist. & Pol. Sci. No. 1, 1914); Barnett,
The Cause of JurisdictionalDisputes in American Trade Unions, 9 HARv. Bus. Rnv.
400 (1931).
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Since these disputes often trap innocent employers between the
competing claims of different unions, the American people have always viewed the strike over work assignments as one of the best examples of the indefensible use of an economic weapon.3 Although
the public has grudgingly accepted that overall good would result from
the normal economic tug-of-war between employers and employees,
it has found no economic or social justification for jurisdictional work
stoppages." Despite this general condemnation, however, judicial and

legislative regulation of this particular mode of union warfare was
tardy. Labor injunctions,5 antitrust injunctions, 6 -and initial attempts to
legislate the problem away all proved unsuccessful. 7 Thus by the end
3. Even well known friends of labor such as President Truman and Senator
Wayne Morse unreservedly condemned jurisdictional strikes and favored legislation to
prohibit them. See 1 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LMRA 480-81, S. REP. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 18-19 (1947); 93 CONG. REc. 136 (1947).
4. See K. STRAND, supra note 1, at 73, 78; SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC
WELFARE, FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1947); Hearings on Bills to Amend and Repeal the National Labor Relations
Act Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3257-81
(1947). In his State of the Union Message for 1947 President Truman stated in part:
"I consider jurisdictional strikes indefensible ....
When rival unions are unable to
settle such disputes themselves, provisions must be made for peaceful and binding determination of the issues." 93 CONG. REc. 136 (1947).
5. See Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906); C. GREGORY, LABOR
AND THE LAw 113-14 (2d rev. ed. 1958); Note, 23 VAND. L. REv. 1376, 1378 n.11
(1970).
6. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970), largely eliminated
nonstatutory injunctive relief as a means for dealing with jurisdictional disputes. See
Green v. Obergfell, 121 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96 F.2d
450, 453 (7th Cir. 1938) (jurisdictional dispute held to be "labor dispute" even in absence of employer-employee relationship). In a last-ditch effort to secure protection
for employers and the public, the Justice Department attempted to use the antitrust
laws to regulate undesirable union conduct. The Supreme Court, however, reading the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970), in light of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, held
that a jurisdictional strike accompanied by secondary pressures did not subject the offending union to a Sherman Act action for damages or an injunction. United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
7. The National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), had provisions for settling work assignment disputes. The Supreme Court, however, struck
down that Act as extending beyond congressional power. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch.
372, 49 Stat. 449, primarily concerned with protecting employee rights of organization,
recognition, and collective activity, had no provisions regulating union conduct. The
Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1185
(1934), had no provision dealing specifically with jurisdictional disputes, although the
provisions of § 2, Ninth, under which the National Mediation Board was to settle representation disputes, potentially provided machinery to encourage, though not compel,
resolution of jurisdictional disputes. Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri K.&T.R.R., 320
U.S. 323, 336-37 (1943). During World War II the War Labor Board was established. Initially, it made no attempt to deal with jurisdictional disputes. By 1942,
however, the Board announced that if labor was unable to settle a dispute, it would
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of World War II the growth of union economic strength under the
protective umbrellas of the Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia Acts made
the problem intolerable. In response to the growing public outcry,
union leaders merely asserted that the problem was one that should
be resolved within the house of labor.8 Congress, however, reacted
with sections 8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k) in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.9
In its attempt to resolve jurisdictional strife effectively, Congress
took two major steps. In section 8(b)(4)(D)' 0 it outlawed jurisdictional warfare by prohibiting a labor organization from using economic
pressures to force -a particular work assignment. The pre-Norris LaGuardia days of the labor injunction, however, indicated that prohibition
alone was not enough. Realizing that unresolved grievances could
build and eventually explode, Congress undertook to resolve the
underlying dispute as well as its immediate manifestations. In section
10(k) it provided what it hoped would be a forum for peaceful resolution of conflicts.1 1 Whenever an employer asserts that a union is
exerting pressure in violation of section 8(b) (4) (D), then section
10(k) commands the National Labor Relations Board to "hear and
determine" the underlying dispute. The statute, however, actively encourages private settlement. If the parties either resolve the dispute
or agree on methods for voluntary adjustment within ten days after
notice of a 10(k) hearing, the Board at least tentatively lacks jurisdiction to make a 10(k) determination.
This unusual procedural formulation is consistent with Congress'
general labor policy of allowing disputants to engage in economic selfdetermination within statutory limits. Moreover, the procedure has
an extraordinary potential to implement a major goal of the administrative process-agency efficiency. By encouraging the combatants
to seek their own settlement before the employer forces them to abide
by an administrative declaration, the statute discourages frequent,
time-consuming treks to the NLRB. Yet while the overworked Board
should enthusiastically welcome any procedure that diverts costly
family disputes to private arbiters, it has consistently discouraged priappoint an arbitrator. The experience under this Act probably inspired the LaborManagement Relations Act's approach to the problem. Sussman, supra note 1, at
210-11.
8. See Hearings,supra note 4, at 1557.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1970).
10. Id. § 158(b)(4)(D).
11. Id.§ 160(k).
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vate resolution. Because of an apparent concern that private arbiters
may reach the wrong substantive resolution of these disputes, the
Board, with the aid of the Supreme Court, has substantially deprived
this exceptional procedure of any practical usefulness.
I.

The Interests Involved in a Jurisdictional Dispute
At first glance a jurisdictional dispute manifests only a bitter
struggle for power between two or more greedy unions. Further
analysis, however, reveals other important interests at stake. Both the
employer and the NLRB, for example, have a substantial interest in
the outcome of jurisdictional disputes and the methods that bring about
their resolution. Furthermore, there are interests of both employees
and their local unions that do not always coincide with those of the
national and international unions.
The employer has an obvious interest in maintaining the efficiency of his operations. When he creates a new job he understandably prefers to assign it to the employee who is most likely to render
the best performance at the least expense. To implement this interest,
the employer must consider many economic variables. First, of
course, he must balance the skills of his employees against the labor
costs that accompany expertise. A highly skilled employee, for example, may yield prolific output of a high quality, but his skills will
no doubt cost more in wages than would those of a less able craftsman. An employer, however, must also look beyond the individuals
isolated performance to the efficiency of the operation as a whole.
Assigning a new job to a particular group of employees may fragment
or confuse overall plant operations.1 2 Additionally, an employer must
attempt to eliminate idle time, unneccessary overtime, undue movement of employees, dual supervision, and other wasteful practices that
detract from the overall efficiency of his production."
In addition to his interest in operational efficiency, however, the
employer may also find motivation to deal with the collective repre12. See, e.g., Longshoremen Local 8, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (May 24, 1973).
13. Printing Pressmen Local 1, 202 N.L.R.B. No. 63 (Mar. 20, 1973) (unnecessary
overtime); Teamsters Local 470, 194 N.L.R.B. 434 (1971) (undue employee movement); Printing Pressmen Local 39, 193 N.L.R.B. 577 (1971) (dual supervision); Laborers Local 1184, 192 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1971) (idle tim&). Other overall efficiency
factors include the need to insure versatility in the work force, Carpenters District
Council, 202 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (Mar. 7, 1973), the need to use the same workers for
both installation and repair, Local 211, Plumbers & Pipe Fitters, 190 N.L.R.B. 90
(1971), and the need to insure an adequate supply of qualified workers, Carpenters Local 1229, 194 N.L.R.B. 640 (1972).
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sentative of his employees that will cause him the least trouble. To
the extent that strong and assertive unions are likely to demand higher
wages for performing a newly created job, this interest is a component
of his profit-maximization interest. But the master may have other
reasons for favoring cooperative unions. He may wish to eliminate
a highly organized craft union that has troubled other areas of his
operations; he may award jobs to a union that is near death, hoping
to inherit unrepresented employees; or he may just perversely dislike
one of the unions vying for the job. These hidden employer interests,
which certainly violate the spirit of the section 8(a)(3) ban on employer discrimination, 14 are important to any method of resolving jurisdictional disputes that takes employer interest into account.
Individual employee and local union interests also play a part in
jurisdictional disputes. An individual employee is obviously anxious
to remain employed. As his employer implements technological
changes, however, he may prefer one of the newer jobs, or the elimination of his old job may force him to seek a new area of expertise.
Similarly, his union shares this interest in expanding into new job
fields. A union's strength is directly proportional to the number of
workers it represents. The union may thus fear obsolesence as much
as the employees themselves, and it can enhance its prestige among
other workers by placing its members in new jobs. The local union's
interest, however, may not precisely correspond to the national or
international union's objectives. For example, since the national will
not feel the pinch of a single plant's job changes as acutely as the local,
the national may be more inclined to avoid fratricidal warfare. Awards
that are satisfactory to the international thus may be totally unacceptable to the individual employee and his local.
The NLRB has two important interests in jurisdictional battles.
Congress has addressed the work assignment dispute, indicating a desire to end those fights with minimum harm to individual employers
and national productivity. Congress believed that disputes could be
more effectively resolved with permanence and a minimum of
economic bloodshed if the parties themselves, rather than the Government, imposed the solution. Congress also presumably intended
that jurisdictional problems consume the least possible administrative
14. Under this section it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization "by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment .

. . ."

29

U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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time and energy. The NLRB thus has an interest in expediency as
well as a duty to implement the statutory scheme. These two goals
can, of course, conflict. Overly hasty action on the part of the Board
can result in inadvertent violations of the policy underlying section
8(b)(4)(D). Undue deliberation and delay on the other hand can
nullify the purpose of section 10(k).
All parties have an interest in rapid resolution of jurisdictional disputes. Long jurisdictional strikes can delay an employer's fulfillment
of contract obligations or even cause him to cease operations altogether. These economic losses seem particularly harsh when an
employer faces the certainty of a strike regardless of the union he
picks to fill a new job. If an employer can procure an injunction
against a strike, he may complete his work and eliminate the new job
before the protracted NLRB procedure determines which union has
a right to fill the position. 5 Since undue delay can only result in the
kind of industrial strife that the National Labor Relations Act meant
to avoid, Congress provided a procedure for resolving work assignment
disputes that encourages the conflicting parties to waive the burdensome administrative machinery and seek their own solutions to their
own problems. In a time of overburdened courts and agencies, the
Board and courts should do everything possible to implement this congressional policy of discouraging litigation.
II.

Procedural Alternatives Under Section 10(k).

Under section 8(b)(4) a union does not commit an unfair labor
practice unless it employs a proscribed means to reach a proscribed
end. Sections 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii) set forth the proscribed means.
Subsection (i) prohibits a labor organization from engaging in or inducing an individual to engage in a strike; subsection (ii) prohibits
a union from threatening or coercing any person, including employers. 1 6 Section 8(b)(4)(D) sets forth the proscribed end that is rele15. O'Donoghue recites a case arising from a dispute over building a dam in which
notice of hearing was eventually quashed by the Board when it learned that the dam
had been completed while the case was pending. O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 330
n.107.
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(i) & (ii) (1970). In 1959 subsection (ii) was added
and the phrase "any employee of any employer" was replaced by the phrase "any indi-

vidual" in what is now subsection (i). Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
§ 704(a), 73 Stat. 541. Thus the section is no longer limited by the definitions of

"employer" and "employee" in § 2(2) and § 2(3) of the Act, and the inducement of

any individual to withhold services falls under the ban of subsection (i). The Supreme
Court, however, has held that an inducement to exercise management discretion, as dis-
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vant to work assignment disputes. Subparagraph (D) makes it an unfair labor practice to use a proscribed means with the object of "forc-

ing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to particular
rather than employemployees in a particular labor organization.
ees in another labor organization . . . unless such employer is failing
to conform to an order or certification of the Board." 17 Thus Congress has made it an unfair labor practice for a union to strike, induce
individuals to strike, threaten to strike,' 8 or use coercion against an

employer in an effort to secure a particular work assignment.
Any aggrieved party may file a charge with the Regional Director
of the NLRB alleging an 8(b)(4)(D) violation. 19 After the charge
has been filed, the Regional Director must serve it on all interested
parties. The Director then investigates to determine whether the

claim has any foundation.

Moreover, section 10()

of the Act

empowers him to seek a federal district court injunction against improper economic pressure if he deems it appropriate.2 0 If his investigation discloses reasonable grounds to believe that the 8(b)(4)(D)
charge has merit, the Regional Director must activate section 10(k).
In effect this step holds the unfair labor practice charge in abeyance
pending the resolution of the underlying dispute via the procedures

set forth in section 10(k). 21 The Regional Director then sends the
tinguished from an inducement to withhold services, is not forbidden unless it is coercive or threatening within the meaning of subsection (ii). NLRB v. Servette, Inc.,
377 U.S. 46, 50-54 (1964).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1970). Under the so-called Safeway doctrine a
single union may use economic pressure to force a work assignment on an employer
as long as no other group of employees disputes its claim to the work. Highway
Truckers Local 107 (Safeway Stores), 134 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1961).
18. Steelworkers Local 4454, 202 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (Mar. 23, 1973).
19. The contending employee groups may file a charge, but employers file the
overwhelming majority. Of the 630 section 8(b)(4)(D) charges closed by the Board
in 1972, employers filed 571. 37 NLRB ANN. REP. 223 (1972).
20. In contrast to other § 8(b) (4) violations, under § 8(b) (4)(D) the Regional
Director is not required to seek injunctive relief. Section 10(l)of the Act provides
that the Regional Director shall seek injunctive relief when an (A), (B), or (C)
charge has been filed and he has reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true
and that a complaint should issue. Section 10(l) continues by providing that "[in
situations where such relief is appropriate the procedure specified herein shall apply
to charges with respect to section 8(b) (4) (D)." 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970) (emphasis supplied). Arguably, injunctive relief is appropriate when a work stoppage is currently underway, but not when picketing or a strike is merely threatened at some indefinite future date. See Johns, JurisdictionalDisputes Under the N.L.R.A., LABOR LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 1967, at 43-44 (13th Annual Institute, Southwestern Legal Foundation). Courts have avoided the question of when injunctive relief under § 8(b)(4)(D)
is appropriate, looking instead to whether there was reasonable cause to believe a violation existed. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Moody, 256 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1958).
21. As the Board has explained:
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interested parties notice of a hearing to be held within ten days along
with a brief statement of the disputed issues.2 2 This ten-day hiatus
gives the parties an opportunity to resolve the dispute or agree on
a method for its peaceful resolution. Congress specifically designed
this limited hands-off period to permit and encourage private settlement in lieu of the less favored, Government-imposed solution.23
Section 10(k) encourages private settlements by empowering the
Board to hear and determine disputes unless, within the ten-day period
following notice of hearing, the parties submit satisfactory evidence
that they have agreed on methods for adjusting the dispute, or that
the dispute has actually been adjusted. If the agreement is simply
on methods for adjusting the dispute, the Regional Director will quash
the scheduled 10(k) hearing, but the 8(b)(4)(D) charge will remain
in effect. 4 If the employee groups have actually resolved the dispute
among themselves, and all but one group have withdrawn their claims
to the work, the Board will quash the 10(k) hearing and dismiss the
8(b)(4)(D) charge as well.25 The remaining group may then use
For an 8(b)(4)(D) charge, Section 10(k) interposes an intermediate formal
step between the completion of investigation of the charge and the issuance
of a complaint based thereon. It provides for a hearing and a declaratory
ruling by the Board on the question of legal entitlement to force or require the
work assignment involved in the underlying dispute, which is designed to facilitate settlement of the dispute and to obviate the need for further proceedings.
Local 595, Ironworkers, 112 N.L.R.B. 812, 814 (1955).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 102.90 (1973).
23. 93 CONo. REc. 4030-35 (1947). In addition to administrative efficiency, a
number of other considerations probably influenced this design. First, organized labor
claimed that the house of labor could resolve jurisdictional disputes without governmental coercion. Second, the War Labor Board had given disputing unions but not
the employer an opportunity to resolve their disagreements without coerciolp. See 93
CONG. REc. 1844-45 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Morse). Finally, the idea that the resolution of disputes by the parties themselves is more effective and lasting pervades
American labor relations law. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 1557 (Remarks of A.F.
Whitney).
24. Laborers Local 670, 189 N.L.R.B. 715 (1971). Although the Board is under
no absolute obligation to permit evidence of an agreed method of settlement after the
ten-day statutory delay period, NLRB v. Local 450, IUOE, 275 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.
1960), it nonetheless has done so in order to comply with the manifest purpose of
the section to encourage voluntary and private resolution of those disputes. Ironworkers Local 708, 137 N.L.R.B. 1753, 1756-57 (1962); 29 C.F.R. § 102.93 (1973). The
Board, however, will hear and determine the dispute when the agreement on methods
for resolving the dispute is not binding on the employer, and the Supreme Court has
upheld this practice, construing the term "parties" to include the employer. NLRB v.
Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
25. When a § 8(b)(4)(D) charge arises, the statute simply denies the Board
power to hear and determine the dispute behind the unfair labor practice if there is
satisfactory evidence of adjustment or agreement on methods of adjustment. But it provides further that "upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of
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otherwise lawful economic pressure2 6 to force its work assignment
demands upon the employer.2
The interunion settlement, however,
must be clear and unequivocal; the Board will not accept disclaimers
of the work when other evidence indicates that the dispute is continu-

ing. 28 Furthermore, the employees themselves must accept the settle-

ment. If they continue to demand the work in spite of union disclaimers, the Board will retain jurisdiction over the dispute.2 9
A.

Board Resolution
When the competing employee groups cannot resolve their dis-

pute or the parties, including the employer, cannot agree on a satisfactory method of settlement, an administrative law judge must hold
a hearing at which the employer and the competing unions may appear
as parties. The hearing is "non-adversary in character, and the
primary interest of the hearing officer is to insure that the record contains as full a statement of the pertinent facts as may be necessary
for a determination of the issues by the Board."8 0 At the end of the
hearing the administrative law judge transmits the record to the Board
along with a written summary of the evidence setting forth the basic

contentions and his analysis of the problem. Unlike the normal adjudicatory hearing, the administrative law judge makes no decision or

recommendation on the merits of the dispute.

1

The Board will finally

the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed." 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970). In contrast to an agreement only on methods
for resolving the dispute, the employer need not be a party to an actual resolution of
the dispute. If all but one union has renounced any claim to the work, the 10(k)
hearing is useless and § 8(b) (4) (D) no longer applies. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S.
116, 134-35 (1971).
26. The union cannot apply forbidden secondary pressures in violation of §
8(b) (4) (B). Some commentators have argued that (B) and (D) should be mutually
exclusive violations, pointing out that in the construction industry any strike can easily
become secondary. Thus, even though it is a jurisdictional dispute that should be
solved through 10(k) processes, the employer can sidestep the determination by filing
a (B) charge. Furthermore, picketing to force acceptance of a 10(k) award would
often, by necessity, be secondary and thus subject to injunction. Local 825, IUOE,
162 N.L.R.B. 1617 (1967); O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 335-37. The Supreme Court
has clearly held that subsections (B) and (D) of 8(b) (4) are not mutually exclusive.
NLRB v. Local 825, IUOE, 400 U.S. 297, 305-06 (1971), rev'g 410 F.2d 5 (3rd Cir.
1969), modifying 162 N.L.R.B. 1617 (1967).
27. Corrugated Asbestos Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1972);
Engineers Local 450, 186 N.L.R.B. 835 (1970).
28. NLRB v. Local 1291, ILA, 368 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1966); Carpenters Local
186, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Mar. 31, 1972).
29. Millwrights Local 1113, 157 N.L.R.B. 996, 1001 (1966).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 101.34 (1973).
31. Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 102.90 (1973).
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resolve the case on the basis of the briefs that the parties file, the
32
record of the hearing, and the administrative law judge's summary.
After the Board announces its decision the Regional Director ascertains whether the disputing labor groups intend to comply with the
Board's work assignment award. If he determines that the losing
group intends to relinquish its claim, he will dismiss the pending
8(b)(4)(D) charge. If the dispute continues, however, the Regional
Director will issue an 8(b)(4)(D) complaint based on the original
charge."8 The 8(b)(4)(D) complaint will then be tried like any other
4
unfair labor practice suit3
This tortuous procedure is suffused with delay, and the inherent
functional overlap can only cause administrative strain. First, the
hearing before the administrative law judge is an essentially useless
endeavor. The dispute must go to the Board for resolution. Without
an opportunity to give his expert opinion on the merits of the case,
the! administrative law judge serves merely an information-gathering
function. Unlike normal unfair labor practice cases, the hearing
officer in 10(k) proceedings has no power to make recommendations
that will be final unless the parties make exceptions to them. 5
Second, while the interplay between 10(k) and 8(b)(4)(D) is consistent with the congressional policy of allowing economic strength to
determine the outcome of nonjurisdictional labor battles, other procedural aspects of this interplay merely create delay. Since the Board
will not relitigate the validity of its 10(k) order at the subsequent
8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice hearing,3 6 it makes no administrative sense to go through the motions of a second hearing. If, during
the ten-day hiatus that 10(k) commands, the parties are unable to resolve the dispute or agree on private methods to do so, one hearing
should suffice to determine both the underlying issues and the legitimacy of economic pressures that the labor unions have exercised.
Moreover, the present two-step procedure gives the employer a substantial opportunity for delay. By filing an 8(b)(4)(D) charge against
a union he may be able to convince the Regional Director to seek a
32. Id. § 101.35 (1973).
33. Thus, if the labor organization repudiating the settlement or the agreed-upon
method attempts to use proscribed pressures to secure the desired work assignment, the
threatened employer is still free to protect himself by resurrecting the dormant § 8(b)
(4) (D) charge. NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
34. Local 595, Ironworkers, 112 N.L.R.B. 812, 814 (1955); 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.36,
102.91 (1973).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
36. Stereotypers Local 22, 160 N.L.R.B. 1184, 1186 (1966).
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10(l) injunction. The time it takes to litigate even a spurious complaint may provide the employer with a breathing spell in his battle with
the rightful claimant.
Judicial review of the 8(b)(4)(D)-10(k) process, though limited, creates additional delay-making potential. Courts have uniformly
held that the 10(k) award itself lacks the finality necessary to make
it reviewable.3 7 Moreover, an employer's refusal to abide by a 10(k)
award does not constitute an unfair labor practice. The employer thus
38
cannot force judicial review of the award via a refusal to comply.
Similarly, the courts have long held that the General Counsel's decision to file or dismiss an unfair labor practice charge is an act of discretion not subject to judicial review. 89 The General Counsel, of course,
will invariably dismiss an 8(b)(4)(D) charge against the union that
prevailed at the 10(k) hearing. Thus, if the losing union acquiesces
in the 10(k) award, the employer who disagrees with that award and
the resulting dismissal of the charge will have no opportunity to seek
judicial review. The losing union, however, can force limited review
of the 10(k) determination by refusing to comply with the award
and then seeking review of the resulting 8(b)(4)(D) adjudication.
Through an unfair labor practice order, the court of appeals can then
review the 10(k) award, though the scope of review will be quite
limited.40
This apparent anomaly-granting limited review to the union and
withholding it from the employer-creates some difficulty. Under the
theory that 8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k) are primarily shields for the neutral employer faced with competing claims for the same work, this result is not unjust. Having elected for economic reasons to continue
the dispute with the prevailing union, the employer cannot fairly com37. Henderson v. ILWU Local 50, 457 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1972); see Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). The Supreme Court has stated
that "the § 10(k) decision standing alone, binds no one. No cease-and-desist order
against either union or employer results from such a proceeding." NLRB v. Plasterers'
Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 126 (1971).
38. To enforce its determination that a party is committing an unfair labor practice in the face of a party's refusal to comply, the Board must normally petition a
court of appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
39. The Supreme Court has held that "the Board's General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint." Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
40. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has opined that Congress did not even intend
the courts "to consider the relevant factors and to weigh and evaluate the evidence
adduced with respect to each." Typographical Union No. 17 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d
755, 765 (5th Cir. 1966), quoting NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engineers, 326 F.2d
213, 218 (3d Cir. 1964).
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plain when the union uses economic weapons against him. Moreover,
if Congress designed the 10(k) hearing primarily to remove a beseiged
employer from the insoluble dilemma of mutually exclusive claims, the
employer has no legally recognizable interest in selecting which union
actually does the work. The Board and the Supreme Court, however,
have rejected this legalistic view in favor of a more pragmatic approach
that recognizes the employer's substantial interest in the efficiency of
his operations.41
The Ninth Circuit has apparently accepted the pragmatic view.
In Waterways Terminal Co. v. NLRB42 it recently held that the
Board's decision to quash a 10(k) hearing was a final order subject
to judicial review because it permitted picketing and precluded an
8(b)(4)(D) complaint. The court carefully distinguished its holding
in Henderson v. Longshoremans' Local" that the General Counsel's
refusal to issue an 8(b)(4)(D) complaint after an actual 10(k) hearing was unreviewable. It reasoned that denial of the "review of a
refusal to proceed -to award under a Section 10(k) proceeding
[would] nullify the effectiveness of Section 8(b)(4)(D),"' 44 but that
denial of review of agency action after a full hearing presumably
would have no such dire effects. Despite its superficial appeal, this
distinction seems doubtful for several reasons. The court did not explain why a refusal to hold a hearing is a "final order" while the determination that flows from a completed hearing is not. As a practical
matter, the result in both cases will often be the same: the Board refuses to process an unfair labor practice complaint. Indeed, in both
cases the Board makes the same underlying determination that there
is no viable 8(b)(4)(D) charge.
While the Ninth Circuit's distinction seems doubtful at best, its
general thrust seems correct. Any person with a substantial stake in
the outcome of agency action is entitled to judicial review.4 5 Under
41. NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
See also Associated
Gen. Contractors v. NLRB, 465 F.2d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 1972); Note, 38 U. Cm.
L. REv. 389, 400-01 (1971).

42. 467 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1972).
43. 457 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1972).
44. 467 F.2d at 1016.
45. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
"[Iln our system of
remedies, an individual whose interest is acutely and immediately affected by an administrative action presumptively has a right to secure at some point a judicial determination of its validity." L. JAFFF, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION 336

(1965). Even if the National Labor Relations Act provides no method for review,
it would seem that § 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1970), might permit review. That section provides that "[a] person suffering legal
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the Supreme Court's new approach, the employer has the necessary
stake in the outcome. In the future courts should examine the consequences rather than the appearances of a 10(k) ruling and recognize

that as a practical matter it is a final order for the employer entitling
him to some judicial review. Yet this seemingly fair solution may entail added delay. Although the trial court is free to dissolve the 10(l)
injunction after the 10(k) hearing and presumably would do so if the
winning union is the party bringing the pressure, the dissatisfied employer might be able to secure the shelter of an injunction or appellate

court stay while he pursues a time-consuming appeal.
B.

Private Settlement
Congress fortunately provided an alternative to the procedural

morass accompanying NLRB resolution of work assignment disputes.
The disputing groups of employees can find their own solution to their
problem. Following the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, the
NLRB encouraged organized labor to develop private institutional
methods for settling these interunion disputes in order to save the

Board from entering this unfamiliar thicket.4" After a number of false
starts, in late 1949 the Building and Construction Trades Department
of the AFL-CIO launched the National Joint Board for the Settlement
of Jurisdictional Disputes.
Although the commentators did not expect
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." For
a discussion of whether the APA provides a jurisdictional basis for review see L. JAFFE,
supra at 165; Byse and Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962
and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HAIv. L. REV. 308,
326-31 (1967); Cramdon, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action, 68
MicH. L. Rv. 389, 443-46 (1970). But cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
46. Address by Paul M. Herzog, Chairman N.L.R.B., American Management Association. in 20 LAB. REL. REP. 97, 104 (1947); Address by Robert N. Denham, General
Counsel N.L.R.B., Associated General Contractors, Dallas, Texas, in 21 LAB. REL.
REP. 44 (1948).

47. K. STRAND, supra note 1, at 92. The AFL-CIO Internal Disputes Plan, 49
L.R.R.M. 64 (1962), is equipped to deal with jurisdictional problems, though it was
not structured for that purpose. The plan is designed to prohibit one union's raiding
of another union's established collective bargaining relationship. But since the line between work assignment and representation can be quite hazy, the plan potentially may
be used to resolve work assignment disputes. The Plan empowers an umpire to initially
determine whether one union has improperly raided another, and it gives a right of
appeal to the Executive Council. The Executive Council uses internal sanctions to enforce decisions, and the parties are forbidden to resort to legal proceedings to enforce
their claims. The Internal Disputes Plan does not provide for any employer participation. Since the Supreme Court has recently held that the employer is a "party" within
the meaning of § 10(k), the Internal Disputes Plan will have no real impact on the
law of work assignment disputes unless it is amended.
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it to last long, the Joint Board and its successor, the Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes Board, have thrived with only one brief lapse in 1969.48
Under the old Joint Board the primary decisionmaking body consisted of an impartial chairman, four members representing the basic
and special trades, and four members representing employers. 49 In
an attempt to emphasize the nonpartisan nature of the resolutions, the
new plan provides for a Joint Administrative Committee of eight persons drawn equally from labor and employers. This committee in turn
must appoint an Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes Board composed of
three impartial members employed by neither the labor nor the
management segments of the industry. This board has the primary
dispute-resolving responsibility. 0 A signatory employer, an employer
association, or a member international union may refer work assignment disputes to the Impartial Board. 51 The Joint Committee must
also appoint an internal Appeals Board composed of three impartial
members employed by neither labor nor management.5" The Joint
Committee must finally select ad hoc Hearing Panels consisting of two
disinterested union presidents, two disinterested employer representatives, and an impartial judge. The primary duty of the Hearings Panel
is to resolve disputes that persist after the Impartial Board's awards.
After attempting to mediate between the parties, the Hearings Panel
hears the case and renders its own decision.5"
The plan purports to bind all international unions affiliated with
the Building and Construction Trades Department, and, of course, it
binds any employer who specifically accedes to the plan.54 Until the
latest revisions of the plan, the major enforcement weapon was denial
to the nonconforming party of the benefit of any future awards. 55 The
current plan does not detail what remedy it will impose upon renegades; it merely indicates that the department has established internal
48. K. SRmr, supra note 1, at 99. The current Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes
Board succeeded the Joint Board on June 1, 1973.
49. Plan for Settling Jurisdictional Disputes Nationally and Locally (AFL-CIO)
art. II, § 1, Apr. 3, 1970.
50. Procedural Rules and Regulations of the Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes
Board and Appeals Board Procedures (AFL-CIO) art. M, H8 2-3; art. V, § 5, June
1, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Plan].
51. Id. at art. V, § 5.
52. Id. at art. IV, § 1.
53. Id. at art. X.
54. Id. at art. L
55. Procedural Rules and Regulations of the National Joint Board For Settlement
of Jurisdictional Disputes Building and Construction Industry and Appeals Board Procedures (AFL-CIO), rule E(c), Oct. 1970.
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procedures for discipline.5 6 The plan reserves to the employer the
right to seek judicial relief from unauthorized pressure, but it makes

no provision for disciplining nonconforming employers.
Since the Impartial Board has no way to enforce its decision

against the employer, he may attempt to avoid an award that does not
satisfy him by assigning the work to the losing union. The beneficiary
of the private award must then use economic pressure to force compliance. The employer may, however, try to relitigate the dispute be-

fore the NLRB by filing another 8(b)(4)(D) complaint.

The ques-

tion then becomes whether economic pressure from the party bene-

fiting from a private award violates section 8(b)(4)(D). Since no
statutory language provides immunity to the beneficiary of a private
award, the literal language of the statute apparently gives the employer
an easy opportunity to avoid compliance with one. Yet the NLRB
has made it clear that it would decline to issue a complaint in favor

of an employer who agreed to accept a private determination at which

57
it was represented, but thereafter repudiated the award.

The employer, however, is not limited to NRLB remedies.5

He

may elect to proceed judicially and sue for damages under section 303

of the Taft-Hartley Act.5 9 Then, the General Counsel's decision not

to file a complaint is irrelevant.60 The court can independently determine whether the defendant union damaged the plaintiff employer by

using proscribed pressure to secure a work assignment in violation of
8(b)(4)(D). The courts have given clear indications that they will
not relitigate the NLRB's work assignment in the guise of a section
301 damages action. 61 Nonetheless, they have signaled that they
56. Plan,supra note 50, at art. VIII, § 2(e).
57. 29 C.F.R. § 102.93 (1973); accord, id. § 101.33 (1973). See also NLRB v.
District Council of Laborers, 443 F.2d 220, 223 (9th Cir. 1971); Brief for NLRB at
28, n.21, NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971). Private awards should
similarly bind labor organizations.
58. ILWU v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 244 (1952).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970). Section 303 provides that any person injured by
an 8(b) (4) unfair labor practice has an action for damages.
60. Not only may § 303 be invoked for illegal activities occurring after an NLRB
order, this section can also be used wholly independent of NLRB orders, and a person
may recover damages for activities of a union coming prior to any NLRB order. Construction Employers' Ass'n v. IUOE, 427 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1970).
61. A final NLRB determination of a jurisdictional dispute will control in a § 301
action that a union brings for breach of contract arising from the same dispute. Typographical Union No. 17 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966); Ironworkers Local
395 v. Council of Carpenters, 347 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. Ind. 1972). Logically, that
determination would also control in an action by an employer, as well as in an action
under § 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
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might not recognize an award from a private body as a defense to a
section 303 action based on a literal 8(b)(4)(D) violation by the
beneficiary of the private award. 62 The courts, however, should resist
any inclinations to put themselves in the place of the congressionally
authorized private settlement procedure. Should they establish a
judicial right to recover under section 303 in the face of a private
award, the employer could effectively control work assignments by ignoring the private award and filing suit against the prevailing union.
The threat of damages would necessarily pressure the unions into compliance with the employer's assignment. This result, however, would
undermine the Supreme Court's announced policy that employer preference should not be the sole factor in resolving work assignment disputes. 3 Moreover, allowing an employer to repudiate his agreement
to a private settlement that is enforceable under section 301 and to
recover damages under section 303 in spite of that binding agreement
would create an intolerable conflict between the two statutory policies. 4 Finally, since the goal of a uniform national labor policy is inherent in the preemption doctrine, the courts and the NLRB should
not treat the same issue in fundamentally different ways.6 5 In the
interest of uniformity and administrative effectiveness the courts
should adopt the NLRB's logical position that a valid private award
is a defense to an 8(b)(4)(D) charge.
II.

The Section 10(k) Decision
In providing the speedy private settlement alternative to the
cumbersome NLRB resolution of the section 10(k) dispute, Congress
meant to ease the labor Board's administrative burden and avoid undue industrial strife. Congress manifestly hoped that the parties
would choose the private alternative, and a truly neutral employer will
probably take the private route -to end the interunion dispute as
62. IBCI v. CJ. Montage & Sons, 335 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1964); Schinella v. Iron-

workers Local 361, 149 F. Supp. 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). There are also indications that
under § 303 the courts have not accepted the Board position that a prerequisite to a
violation of 8(b)(4)(D) is two or more competing unions. Courts have indicated in
dicta that a dispute between the employer and one union over the assignment of work
can result in an 8(b)(4)(D) violation. NLRB v. Local 25, IBEW, 383 F.2d 449,
454 (2d Cir. 1967).

But see Plasterers' Local 79 v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir.

1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 116 (1971) (court of appeals held that picketing to
a private award was not a violation of § 8(b) (4) (D) when the Board, without
tion, made a contrary award pursuant to 10(k)).
63. NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 364 U.S. 573, 580
64. See NLRB v. Local 1291, ILA, 345 F.2d 4 (3rd Cir. 1965).
65. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
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quickly as possible. Employers, however, have interests other than
the rapid settlement of disputes. An employer who prefers one of
the disputing employee groups will naturally choose the forum that is
most likely to confirm his choice. Whether by chance or design, the
NLRB bases its decisions on factors that make the Board more likely
than the institutionalized private machinery to agree with the employer. Thus, an employer who is interested in the outcome of a dispute may be willing to forgo the celerity of the private machinery
to ensure that his choice will prevail.
A.

NLRB Resolution in the Aftermath of CBS

Once the NLRB assumes jurisdiction under section 10(k), the
statute obliges it to "hear and determine the dispute." For thirteen
years after the Taft-Hartley Act, however, the NLRB entertained a
very restrictive view of this obligation. It read section 8(b)(4)(D)
literally as a limitation on its power. Consequently, the Board felt
that it could not make affirmative awards contrary to employer assignments."' The Board probably based this timid position on its underlying lack of confidence in its background and expertise to resolve
jurisdictional disputes. Nevertheless, this attitude gave an employer
the unlimited right to assign work as he pleased unless the assignment
violated a prior Board order or certification, or unless a specific contract between the employer and the complaining union granted that
union the disputed work. 7
The Board made several legal arguments in support of this position. It contended that an affirmative award in the face of the literal
language of 8(b)(4)(D) created a potential inconsistency between
sections 10(k) and 303. While a Board award might entitle a union
to certain work, the union's use of economic pressure to enforce its
award might make it liable for damages under 8(b)(4)(D). Furthermore, the Board argued that an affirmative award under 10(k) would
discriminate or cause employer discrimination in violation of sections
8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2).68 Especially if one contending group was un-

66. Sussman, supra note 1, at 204. See also Local 675, IUOE, 116 N.L.R.B. 27,
38 n.10 (1956); ILWU, Local 16, 82 N.L.R.B. 650 (1949).
67. Brief for NLRB at 9-10, NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 364
U.S. 573 (1961).
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1970). Section 158(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage mem-

433
HeinOnline -- 52 Tex. L. Rev. 433 1973-1974

Texas Law Review

Vol. 52:417, 1974

organized, an affirmative Board award would cause the employer to
encourage membership in the successful labor organization. 69 Finally,
the Board believed that if it acted as the ultimate arbiter of jurisdictional disputes, unions seeking to overrule their employers' assignments would strike more often to gain access to 10(k) proceedings,
which would result in more industrial strife. 70
The Supreme Court finally resolved the matter in NLRB v. Radio
& Television Broadcast Engineers (CBS),71 a case involving a truly
neutral employer. The contending unions both desiredl the task of
providing lighting for a live nonstudio television broadcast. Each
group was organized and had a contract with the employer. In the
10(k) hearing the Board, finding no contrary certification or contractual obligation, refused to change the employer's assignment. The contesting union refused to comply, and the Board processed the
8(b)(4)(D) complaint. The Second Circuit denied enforcement of
the Board's order, reasoning thal section 10(k) required the Board
to make a positive determination and award. The court felt that the
Board's failure to exercise properly its 10(k) jurisdiction prohibited
it from prosecuting an 8(b)(4)(D) complaint.7 2 The Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the Second Circuit. In contrast to the Board,
the Court directed its attention away from 8(b)(4)(D) and looked
to the literal requirements of 10(k). Notwithstanding any prohibitions in 8(b)(4)(D), the Court concluded that section 10(k)'s "hear
and determine" conferred a positive duty on the Board to decide each
dispute on its merits. 73 Ironically, while the NLRB argued that it was
unqualified to resolve work assignment disputes on their merits, Justice Black heaped praise upon it and reassured the Board of its competence to make wise awards.7 4 The Court unfortunately did not set
bership in a labor organization." Section 158(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice

for a labor organization "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee" in violation of section 158(a) (3).
69. Brief for NLRB at 10-11, NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs,
364 U.S. 573 (1961); O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 315.
70. See Local 173, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers' Int'l Union, 121 N.L.R.B. 1094,
1108-13 (1958).
71. 364 U.S. 573 (1961), aff'g 272 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1959).
72. NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 272 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1959).
73. The Court explicitly held that "it is the Board's responsibility and duty to decide which of two or more employee groups claiming the right to perform certain work
tasks is right and then specifically to award such tasks in accordance with its decision."
364 U.S. at 586.
74. Given the Board's current reluctance to relinquish its 10(k) jurisdiction or give
any substantial weight to Joint Board awards, the Board has apparently shed its inferiority complex.
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forth the criteria the Board should use. Rather, Justice Black merely
mentioned in passing "standards generally used by arbitrators, unions,
employers, joint boards and others in wrestling with this problem. ' 75
The CBS decision forced the Board to alter its proceedings
abruptly and to make an introspective examination of the factors it
should consider in resolving troublesome jurisdictional problems.
After more than a year of self-evaluation and discussion with union
leaders and employers, -the Board issued its first 10(k) determinations
and awards. These set the pattern and tone for all future 10(k)
determinations. The Board announced that rather than formulate
general rules, it would resolve each case upon its own facts after considering all the relevant factors. The Board then presented its list of
relevant factors. These included, it said,
[t]he skills and work involved, certifications by the Board,
company and industry practice, agreements between unions
and between employers and unions, awards of arbitrators,
joint boards and the AFL-CIO in the same or related cases,
the assignment by the employer, and the efficient operation
of the employer's business.76
The Board finally stated that it would determine the appropriate
weight for each factor on a case-by-case basis. True to its word, the
Board pays little attention to its own precedents, and the relative
weight it gives to each of the listed criteria runs the full gamut from
outcome determinative to utter insignificance. 77 Yet throughout
almost ten years of Board determinations, it has maintained consistency
78
in results: it overwhelmingly upholds employer preference.
1. Board Certification.-Board certification is the only factor
that the statute specifically requires the NLRB to recognize. If a
Board certification covers particular work, the union that received the
certification is entitled to the work. The mere fact of certification,
however, is not enough: the certificate must specifically cover the
work in question. Accordingly, since certifications are seldom suffi75. 364 U.S. at 583.
76. International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 1743, 135 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1410-11
(1962) (Jones Construction case). These general criteria were judicially approved in
NLRB v. Local 825, IUOE, 326 F.2d 213 (3rd Cir. 1964).
77. O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 321 & n.51.
78. Only five of the first 55 awards made following CBS went contrary to employer preference. O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 322. Other writers have witnessed
this phenomenon. See Johns, supra note 20, at 53; Sussman, supra note 1, at 225.
A survey by the author of 10(k) awards from 1970 through June 1973 indicates that
of 282 awards only 10 refused to uphold the employers' assignments.
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ciently precise, this factor is rarely determinative.79
2. Third Party Awards.-Observers uniformly agree that the
NLRB should rely heavily on past and current private awards.80 Yet
while the Board ostensibly considers third party awards, it seldom
gives them any substantive weight. In most cases in which the private
award and the Board decision coincide, the Board mentions the private
award in support of a conclusion based largely on other factors."' On
the other hand, when the Board disagrees with the private decision,
it usually either refuses to follow the decision or ignores it altogether.8 2
Nevertheless, on very rare occasions the Board, without any apparent
reason for its departure from the norm, gives heavy emphasis to a private award. 83
One reason for the Board's reluctance to follow third party awards
is its hesitance to rely on a proceeding in which all the parties did
not participate.8 4 Although the Board properly desires to ensure full
employer participation in the dispute-resolving machinery, it should
not discard private awards so hastily. The employer has an opportunity to present his observations at the 10(k) hearing, and the Board
can weigh that viewpoint against the private body's conclusions. If
the employer's arguments have merit, the Board can reject the private
award. But if the employer has nothing more to add than a statement
of his preference, then the Board has little reason for denying the
private award the weight it is due. While the NLRB has no objective
way to calculate the appropriate weight to give a private decision
rendered in the employer's absence, it can use its common sense and
its knowledge of the evidence to estimate how persuasive the employer's arguments would have been to the private body. Moreover,
79. Schmidt, What Is the Current Status of Work Assignment Disputes? 16 IAB.
LJ. 270, 292 (1965). But cf. International Die Sinkers Conference, 197 N.L.R.B. No.
173 (June 30, 1972).

80. Schmidt, supra note 79, at 293; Sussman, supra note 1, at 228-30; Note, 77
YALE L.J. 1191, 1199 (1968); ABA SECTION ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 1965 CommrrTEE REPORTS 457 (1965).

81. See, e.g., Construction & Gen. Laborers, Local 452, 193 N.L.R.B. 375 (1971).
82. See, e.g., Ironworkers Local 272, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 178 (May 31, 1973). A
survey by the author showed that the Board ignored or declined to follow past and
current private awards in thirty-nine cases between January 1970 and July 1973.
83. See, e.g., Local 40, Ironworkers, 197 N.L.R.B. No. 112 (June 21, 1972).
84. Plumbers Local 55, 184 N.L.R.B. No. 105 (Aug. 17, 1970); St. Paul Bldg.
Trades Council, 180 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1970). See also Steamfitters Local 420, 198
N.L.R.B. No. 38 (July 17, 1972). If the employer did participate in the private arbitration, the Board does not evrn have jurisdiction. Hence, this rationale would deprive the private award of weight in all .cases adjudicated by the Board.
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since the employer normally elected to forego the private proceedings,
he knowingly ran the risk of an adverse private award. The Board
need not show undue sympathy for a party who avoided a congressionally authorized, time-saving device.
The Board has also grounded its aversion to a third party award
on its observation that the private body failed to state the reasons for
its decision.8 5 The requirement that the private award prove itself,
in reality, however, is a red herring. Since both sides in a work
assignment dispute usually have cogent arguments in support of their
positions, the announced factors may be immaterial to the particular
dispute, or they may offset each other. The Board is somewhat shortsighted in ignoring a judgment from an expert body simply because
it failed to recite fully a list of rather meaningless factors. The
Supreme Court has willingly deferred to arbitration even though "[airbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an
award."8 6 The Joint Board published its criteria and the new Impartial Board will no doubt follow them. With the notable absence
of employer preference, this list does not differ markedly from the
NLRB's criteria. The Board should not assume that the Impartial
Board is not applying its criteria simply because it fails to incant them
with each award. Indeed, the Board might do well to examine some
of its own rather uninformative opinions. After reciting its overworked list of factors, the labor Board usually concludes, without substantive analysis, that the facts render some factors "inconclusive." It
then concludes that some other factors "not inconsistent with" employer assignments should prevail. The Impartial Board's quick resolution of disputes via its shortform decisions is preferable to the NLRB's
involved opinions that do little to educate the litigants and apparently
take weeks to draft.
3. Interunion Agreements.-If the disputing employee groups
have in fact established their jurisdictional boundaries by private
agreement and their dispute concerns only exact application of the
agreement, the Board could appropriately recognize the agreement
and interpret it to conform to the parties' original intent. The approach would be consistent with the Safeway doctrine that two disputing employee groups are necessary to make a, jurisdictional dispute
cognizable under the Act.87 The Board's early practice of giving
85. Plumbers Local 55, 184 N.L.R.B. No. 105 (Aug. 17, 1970).
86. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
87. Local 107, Teamsters (Safeway Stores), 134 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1961).
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heavy weight to interunion agreements,8 8 however, was philosophically
inconsistent with its scanty attention to third party awards. The
Board's insistence on employer participation at third party adjudications is difficult to square with its position of permitting two disputing
unions to resolve the difficulty in advance without even considering
the factors a third party would use and without employer participation.
Perhaps because of this inconsistency, the Board in Carpenters' District Council 9 quickly retreated from its strong position favoring interunion agreements. In that case the Board held that interunion agreements purporting to control jurisdictional disputes would not be determinative and implied that it might ignore them in the face of counterbalancing factors. This unfortunate decision runs contrary to the established policy of encouraging labor organizations to agree in advance
to avoid industrial strife. If the disputing unions have limited their
own jurisdictional claims, the Board should not encourage any one of
them to extend those limits unilaterally.
In practice the Board ignored the two most important factors for
resolving work assignment disputes: third party awards and interunion
agreements. This disregard probably stems from its firm belief that
the employer should have a voice in jurisdictional disputes; accordingly, the Board is inherently suspicious of private procedures in which
the employer did not participate. Thus, the NLRB's position on the
merits of agreements and awards is incongruously dictated by its concern for the mechanics of dispute resolution. If it would relax its adherence to this procedural concept, possibly it could slide into a consistent analysis that would give proper weight to these two very important factors.
4. Collective Agreements Between Employer and Union.-Although the Board has stated that it will not consider collective bargaining contracts unless they direct a work assignment in "clear and unambiguous terms," 90 it nonetheless pays a distressing amount of attention to them. It gives them controlling weight in many cases 91 and
substantial consideration even when they only colorably cover the disputed work. 92 The Board is not reluctant to giving collective bargain88. Local 68, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers, 142 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1963).
89. 146 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1245 (1964); see Schmidt, supranote 79, at 280.
90. Teamsters Local 470, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (May 15, 1973); see O'Donoghue,
supra note 1, at 326.
91. E.g., IBEW Local 3, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (July 24, 1972).
92. E.g., Printing Pressmen, Local 23, 186 N.L.R.B. 843 (1970).
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ing contracts preference over contrary area practice and inconsistent
third party awards. 93 Again, this stance puts the Board in a logically
inconsistent position. It refuses to give substantial weight to third
party awards or prior interunion contracts, reasoning that all interested
parties should be present; yet it is willing to give effect to collective bargaining contracts that exclude the complaining party. Moreover, the
Board's refusal to give substantial effect to arbitration awards based
on the collective bargaining contract when all parties were not represented at the arbitration proceeding aggravates this inconsistency. 94 If
the contract is an important factor, it is no less important when an
arbitrator renders a definitive interpretation of it regardless of what
parties appeared at the arbitration.
The Board's error does not lie in denying private arbitration
awards; it lies in giving substantial emphasis to bilateral collective bargaining agreements, whether or not they contain arbitration provisions.
The Board, of course, should honor and enforce contracts that specifically disclaim work. Likewise, it should respect provisions that
establish particular criteria for resolving disputes, unless they necessarily favor the contracting union.9 5 Moreover, it should always honor
and give substantial weight to contracts that call for submission of disputes to a third party for resolution. But grave danger exists when
an employer can, by contracting with his favorite union, exclude wellfounded claims for the work by other labor groups. Unlike the
employer, who is free to resort to economic opposition if he dislikes
the unions' solution, the union ignored in a contract has no legal redress. If the Board follows its usual practice and awards the work
according to the contract, section 8(b)(4)(D) bars the excluded
union from any economic resistance. The Board can reduce the
obvious potential for abuse inherent in this situation by disregarding
self-serving jurisdictional clauses in collective bargaining contracts for
work not being performed at the time of the contract.90
5. Tradition.-Labor-management tradition, as a factor in re93. Ironworkers Local 272, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 178 (May 31, 1973) (inconsistent
Joint Board Awards); Teamsters Local 729, 200 N.L.R.B. No. 160 (Jan. 2, 1973) (contrary area practice).
94. E.g., Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. Lodge 27, 198 N.L.R.B. No.
64 (July 26, 1972).
95. See IBEW Local 122, 182 N.L.R.B. 538 (1970).
96. This should not result in any collision with courts that might be called upon
to enforce the contractual work assignment under § 301 of the Act. When the Board
has resolved disputes via § 10(k), the courts have deferred to that resolution and refused to relitigate the issues under § 301.
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solving jurisdictional disputes, has two broad aspects. Its geographical
aspect is best viewed as a series of concentric circles of practice, including within them shop practice, area practice, and industry practice.
Established shop practice represents an accommodation between the
employer and the competing labor groups. It resembles a tripartite
agreement in that all parties find a particular division of the work
acceptable. The Board, of course, should give heavy weight to the
status quo in order to discourage union adventurism and restrain
employer proclivities for union-busting. A general rule of giving
great weight to the status quo, however, should be subject to two important exceptions. Since shop practice does not represent a silent
accommodation between a transient employer and competing labor
groups, the Board should not give great weight to the employer's practice at another locale. Additionally, when shop custom favors an unorganized group the dispute may take on the characteristics of a
struggle for representation. If the Board decides the dispute under
10(k) and awards the work to the organized group, it may be forcing
de facto recognition in derogation of the unorganized employees'
organizational rights. Yet if the labor Board awards the work to the
unorganized group, it may forestall valid organizational efforts. In
these situations the Board should avoid the dilemma by adjudicating
any pressures to change the status quo under section 8(b)(7),97
rather than under section 10(k) and 8(b)(4)(D).
Area practice manifests the tripartite agreement to a particular
division of work on a larger scale than shop practice. Maintaining
consistent area practice has the important social function of ensuring
the mobility of work forces. For example, if a crane operating engineer loses his job, he will search for similar crane work in the area.
But if machinists handle the same work elsewhere in the area, the
unemployed crane operator must change occupations, change unions,
or leave the area. Each of these alternatives imposes a substantial
hardship on the individual. To avoid these hardships he may pressure
his union to secure work for him on other jobs, and in response to
this pressure his union may attempt to expand its jurisdiction. This
spiraling process would ultimately shatter industrial peace. Thus,
where shop custom conflicts with area practice, the Board would best
serve long-range industrial peace by striving to secure a consistent area
practice. Particularly in businesses characterized by worker mobility

97. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970).
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and cyclical' employment opportunities, such as construction, the need
for uniformity is great.
Unfortunately, the NLRB has consistently given the heaviest
weight to an individual employer's past practices.9
Even if an
employer has followed a particular shop practice for as little as one
year, the Board will show it substantial favor. 9 Still, on rare occasions, the Board will allow area practice to overcome employer preference. 10 0 Adding to the confusion, the Board seldom attempts to define the relevant area; it simply announces its conclusion that area
practice favors one of the parties.101 In the rare cases in which it
does attempt to draw geographical lines, it does not explain its rationale.

02

All of this turmoil results from the Board's failure to take an analytical approach to the problem. Rather than labelling area practice
"inconclusive" and moving on to other factors,1" 3 the Board should
take a three-step approach in viewing the geographical aspect of the
tradition factor. First, it should precisely define the relevant area by
examining the nature of the trade and the mobility of the work force.
Then, looking solely to the employees within that area, it should determine the dominant practice. Finally, it should decide how much
weight to give to the prevailing practice. If the Board cannot find
a clearly dominant practice in the relevant area, it should, of course,
give shop practice greater weight. But whenever a dominant area
practice exists, long-range labor policy dictates that it should prevail
over shop practice. This emphasis on area practice will encourage the
parties to disregard the status quo only when they are aware of a difference between their practice and area practice. If the employer
elects to fight the established local tradition he is free to do so, and
if his motivation is strong enough, presumably he can prevail. Other

98. E.g., Plumbers Local 13, 195 N.L.R.B. 471 (1972). The Board has given past
practice preference over area practice. Ironworkers Local 55, 200 N.L.R.B. No. 96
(Nov. 30, 1972).
99. Laborers Local 663, 195 N.L.R.B. 62 (1972).
100. Teamsters Local 85, 191 N.L.R.B. 493 (1971). In Operating Eng'rs Local 4,
198 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (Aug. 15, 1972), however, the Board wisely allowed area practice to prevail over employer preference.
101. See, e.g., Ironworkers Local 172, 201 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (Feb. 14, 1973).
102. See, e.g., Longshoremen Local 8, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (May 24, 1973)
(single state area practice); Ironworkers Local 29, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (Sept. 27,
1972) (two state area practice); Carpenters Local 1229, 194 N.L.R.B. 640 (1972)
(single city area practice).
103. See, e.g., Plasterers Local 114, 201 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (Jan. 11, 1973).
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employers, following his lead, may eventually develop a new area custom, which the Board should later recognize.
As the area under consideration grows larger, consistent practice
becomes less important. Uniformity serves no useful purpose outside
the area of worker mobility. A difference in longshoreman assignments between Seattle and Miami, for example, would probably not
affect the workers involved. In industries with high worker mobility,
however, like some heavy construction projects, the relevant area practice may include the entire nation. While deviations from distant
practice usually do not encourage pressures that could cause individual
hardship or interunion disputes, national or trade practice can always
serve as a useful guide, demonstrating how other areas have resolved
a particular problem. Using the analogy of judicial decisions from
sister jurisdictions, the NLRB should view national practice as persuasive but not controlling authority.
The second broad aspect of the labor-management tradition
factor is functional. It stresses the relationship between the generally
accepted nature of a craft and the particular task. In one case, for example, the Board had to decide which of two unions should perform
the solemn function of sugar tasting. 104 Both longshoremen, who took
the sugar from the dock to the ship, and the sugar refinery's
employees, who placed the sugar on the dock, claimed the work. The
Board felt that since this epicurean assignment was more closely related
to sugar refining than to loading ships, the job should go to the refinery employees. This kind of analysis, however, necessarily entails
a frustrating lack of precision. No functional distinction between men
who haul bags to a dock and men who haul bags from a dock makes
either group's taste buds more suited to pass judgment on the quality
of sugar. When a union demands work that is far beyond its functional bailiwick, the Board should be able to recognize the irrationality
of the claim. But in cases where none of the competing groups is
inherently nore qualified to perform a newly created function, the
Board should avoid engaging in a futile and misleading functional analysis of the competing groups' work.1 5

104. ILA, 137 N.L.R.B. 1458 (1962).
105. A factor that can occasionally aid the Board in making a functional decision
is the historical declarations of the unions themselves in their charters, constitutions,
and affiliations. When they do not conflict with another union's similarly well-established claims, long settled assertions give the Board a useful basis for what necessarily
is an arbitrary decision.
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6. Efficiency.-The NLRB frequently gives efficiency substantial weight in its work assignment determinations. The term encompasses so many variables, however, that it is unwieldy unless subdivided
into more manageable units. The single most important component of
efficiency is employee skill, because it determines the quality of work
and the hourly output. The Board, of course, would undermine
economic and social policy if it awarded work to a group that lacked
the training and ability to perform the assigned task expeditiously.
The Board, however, has not ignored employee skill in making its
determinations; in fact it has overworked that subfactor.' 00 Once a
group shows that it has the basic ability to perform the work, the Board
should end its inquiry into employee skill.' 07 The Board is not
equipped to make fine value judgments about which group has the
greatest ability to perform the work. The employer, by contrast, is
in a good position to evaluate his employees, and his assignment will
undoubtedly take their skill into account.
Another component of efficiency is labor cost. At some point
the cost per unit of output can be so great that the Board must necessarily consider the employer's costs, and, as with basic skill, it should
not make totally unreasonable awards. Unfortunately, the Board usually goes beyond threshold reasonableness and actually views wage
rates as an independent factor in resolving work assignment disputes.'0 8 In Teamsters Local 294109 the employer had assigned the
relevant work to his current nonunion employees. At that point, the
Teamsters stepped in and demanded the work. Although the dispute
obviously took on aspects of an organizational dispute, the Board nonetheless heard the case pursuant to section 10(k). In awarding the
work to the nonunion employees the Board emphasized the lower
wage scale for nonunion workers. The possibility that the Teamsters
would be paid on a uniform scale at a higher rate than the employer
presently paid plainly influenced the Board, and it even voiced concern that the employer could not afford the higher rate.
Teamsters Local 294 vividly illustrates the impropriety of the
Board basing awards on the employer's economic considerations. It

106. See, e.g., Ironworkers Local 68, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (April 25, 1972).
* 107. See Sussman, supra note 1, at 217.
108. See, e.g., Ironworkers Local 395, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 19 (April 5, 1972). But
see Laborers Local 459, 201 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (Jan. 23, 1973).
109. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (July 10, 1972). See also Local 474, IBEW, 198
N.L.R.B. No. 10 (July 17, 1972).

443
HeinOnline -- 52 Tex. L. Rev. 443 1973-1974

Texas Law Review

Vol. 52:417, 1974

has no expertise to pass judgment on whether an employer should use
a variable or a fixed wage scale; it is not qualified to hold an
employer's wages to a minimum or to determine what wages he can
afford. 110 Since wages combine inseparably with employee skill as a
single motivating factor behind an employer's assignment, holdings
like Teamsters Local 294 will tend to drive down wages and favor
minimally skilled workers over the established trades. Congress
delegated the Board no authority to accomplish these social changes.
Assuming that the Board should give some consideration to cost
efficiency, employer preference is the best vehicle for this recognition.
The employer's good faith choice of employees is probably an exercise of his best business judgment based on a composite of all the
economic factors, and the Board should not lightly attempt to secondguess his economic analysis. Nevertheless, the Board should not entirely forsake economic analysis. When the employer's choice is clearly
unreasonable, the Board should alert itself to the possibility that noneconomic factors have motivated the choice. It should carefully examine the facts to determine whether the employer's motive was to
avoid a valid contract or eliminate a weak union, or whether the union
had subjected him to undue pressures before he made the assignment.
7. Employer Preference.-While the Board does make awards
without specific reference to this supposedly independent factor,' in
practice it rarely deviates from the employer's choice. Critics point
out that factors like relative union strength and cooperativeness, which
should be foreign to national labor policy, can influenc, employer
assignments.11 2 Additionally, if employer preference carries significant weight, unions will doubtless engage in sub rosa pressures to gain
the initial assignment. Finally, the Board's long-run ratification of
employer assignments certainly violates the spirit of the CBS doctrine
that the Board should make an independent determination of work
assignment disputes. Other commentators have asserted that employers can correctly evaluate the relevant factors without wasting the
Board's time." 3 While this position perhaps goes too far in applauding employer acumen, employer preference represents a simplified and
relatively accurate evaluation of the numerous efficiency factors. When

110. See Iyman and Jaffee, JurisdictionalDisputes, N.Y.U.

FIRST ANNuAL CONFER-

ENCE ON LABOR LAW 423, 454 (1948); O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 328.

111. Plumbers Local 420, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (July 17, 1972).
112. Sussman, supra note 1, at 215.
113. See Johns, supra note 20, at 53.
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the Board rests its decision on unstated or inconclusive factors, 11 4 an
award contrary to employer assignment seems overly harsh. The employer is entitled to his choice at least when the Board can find no
reasons -for disallowing it. The Board, however, has allowed this equitable consideration to evolve into a de facto presumption in favor of the
employer's choice. Currently the union challenging an employer's assignment must carry the burden of demonstrating why the assignment is
improper. Thus, while the Board has not erred in considering
employer preference, it has mistakenly neglected to view employer
preference as a factor wholly dependent upon the numerous economic
factors underlying it.
In reality employer preference, efficiency, and shop custom are
not independent factors for the Board to add together and weigh in
their totality. They are overlapping considerations springing from a
common root, which, when added together, give an entirely distorted
picture of the number and weight of the considerations favoring the
incumbent employee group. Under the Board's current approach the
incumbent union starts off with all three considerations plus, perhaps,
a collective agreement in its favor. With this built-in disadvantage,
challenging unions have rarely upset employer selection. 1 15 Accordingly, when the Board compares a single award or an ambiguous
agreement with all these opposing concerns, it almost always reaffirms
the employer's initial choice.
If the Board insists on considering multiple factors in making
work assignment decisions, it must at least reevaluate the weight it
accords each factor. It should abandon its ad hoc determinations and
frankly acknowledge that some factors are more persuasive than
others. Furthermore, when the Board views employer preference, it
should correspondingly discount the shop custom that flows naturally
from that preference. Likewise, a collective agreement assigning the
work is probably a reflection of employer preference, and the Board
should appropriately discount it. Since interunion agreements and
third party awards at least have some element of impartiality, the
Board should give these factors priority over economic factors dominated by employer self-interest. Even if the Board rules for the contesting union despite an employer's economic interests, the employer
still has a chance to protect his economic determination by refusing
114. See Teamsters Local 920, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (Oct. 20, 1972).
115. See, e.g., Lathers Local 104, 186 N.L.R.B. 365 (1970).
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tc accept the award and facing the union's counterpressures. But
when the Board bases its award upon an employer's economic motives,
8(b)(4)(D) prevents the losing union from asserting economic
interest and the interunion agreement or third party award that
supports that interest.
By refusing to give employer preference prima facie validity, the
Board could also discourage mad scrambles for the initial assignment.
In Glaziers Local 1029,116 for example, the incumbent union used
economic pressures prohibited by 8(b)(4)(D) to secure a work
assignment. The employer, capitulating to the pressure, also signed
a collective bargaining agreement that assigned the work to the union.
The Board properly disregarded both employer preference and the
collective agreement as factors in resolving the dispute, and awarded
the work to the employer's previous nonunion employees. Preassignment pressure destroys employer preference as an accurate guide to
the underlying efficiency considerations, and to the extent that the
Board can discover this pressure, it should reduce the weight it gives
to employer preference. Cases like Glaziers force the Board to venture into an efficiency analysis in order finally to resolve the dispute.
8. Economic and Social Impact.-The Board has recently
evinced a commendable concern for the economic impact that a particular award might have on employees. 11 The Board has tried to
soften the blow of automation by giving jobs on machines to the
workers who were replaced by the machinery." 8 When some loss of
work is inevitable, the Board has attempted to ameliorate the loss by
determining which group was more susceptible to training for the new
jobs. 1 9 In Seafarers Union 2 9 the introduction of new machinery
caused an area-wide loss of employment among workers who unloaded
ships. The Seafarers and the Operating Engineers both claimed jurisdiction over the job of operating the new machinery. After a careful
analysis of the facts, the Board noted the relative sizes of the unions
and the employment possibilities in the area. It concluded that an
award to the Operating Engineers would cause extreme hardship to
the Seafarers Union and its members. While the small Seafarers
Union had limited work opportunities elsewhere in the area, the giant

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

196 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (April 14, 1972).
See, e.g., Stereotypers Union, 201 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (Feb. 15, 1973).
Typographers Local 2, 142 N.L.R.B. 36 (1963).
Stereotypers Union, 181 N.L.R.B. 784 (1970).
182 N.L.R.B. 633 (1970).
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Operating Engineers Union had many contracts and could absorb the
particular dislocation with less catastrophic effect. While the policy
of resolving disputes on the basis of need may erode into an undesirable general presumption in favor of the weaker union, the Board in
this case resolved the technological problem in a laudable fashion.
The Board's concern for employee well-being has been damned
as an activity that involves an economic analysis of the wisdom of re21
taining certain job skills that the Board has no expertise to make.1
In some cases the Board may lack the data necessary to make the
award that has the least harmful economic and social consequences
to the workers. But if the data is available, the Board need not ignore
it. Industrial flux necessarily affects employees, and while the employer will invariably resolve the work attrition problem according to
his best economic interests, the Board can view the problem in com22
munity or national perspective.
B.

PrivateSettlement and the Green Book Method

In contrast to the NLRB, the new Impartial Board, just as did
the Joint Board before it, bases its decisions primarily on agreements
between disputing unions and previous decisions of record, popularly
called "Green Book" agreements and decisions.' 2 A Green Book
decision or agreement that covers a dispute is conclusive. If the
Green Book does not speak to the controversy, the Impartial Board
will consider the established trade practice and the prevailing local
practice. 24 The plan also provides that since "efficiency, cost or
continuity and good management are essential to the well-being of the
industry, the Board shall not ignore the interests of the consumer in
settling jurisdictional disputes."'' 25 Thus, the Impartial Board at least
theoretically considers all of the parties' -relevant interests, except the
employer's interest in dealing with a weaker union. The substantial

121. Sussman, supra note 1, at 219. But see Cohen, The N.L.R.B. and Section
10(k): A Study of the Reluctant Dragon, 14 LAB. LJ. 905, 915 (1963).
122. The Board, as it should, has also considered the racial practices of the claimants
and has refused to award work to a racially discriminatory union. Longshoremen Local 440, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (Aug. 8, 1972). It has also concerned itself with
worker safety. Sheet Metal Workers Local 416, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (May 3, 1973).
123. Plan, supra note 50, at art. VI, § 1(a). To control, the decision must be
"of record." To be "of record," the agreement of decision must be recognized under
the provisions of the constitution of the Building and Constructions Trades Department.
Plan for Settling Jurisdictional Disputes, supra note 49, at art. Im, §§ 1(a)-(c).
124. Plan, supra note 50, at art. VI, § 3.
125. Id.
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employer representation in the Board selection process ensures that
it will not ignore legitimate employer interests.
C.

The Interplayof Substance andProcedure

While the NLRB's performance is not entirely inadequate, its unsophisticated substantive analysis has procedural repercussions that run
counter to congressional intent. In almost form-book style the typical
Board opinion gives the facts, the jurisdictional basis, a list of factors,
a brief discussion of the factors in which many of them are labelled
"inconclusive," and the conclusion. The Board's decisions, however,
are consistent with its initial pronouncement that it would not feel
bound by precedent. 1 26 In fact, it is nearly impossible to find
even a thread of consistency in the Board's work assignment decisions.
Although the Board need not be a slave to precedent, its rejection
of stare decisis is apparently little more than a rationalization for its
lack of coherent analysis. Employers and unions need to know how
important the Board considers each of its listed factors in order to
guide their future conduct. For example, they should be able to tell
whether entering into jurisdiction-limiting contractual claims is worth
their time and effort. The NLRB is not advancing the cause of industrial peace when, after twelve years, it cannot even decide whether
a particular factor is important. Moreover, while the Impartial Board
relies on factors closely resembling the NLRB's list, it cannot remain
faithful to the NLRB's analysis because the labor Board never reveals
how it weights each factor. If the NLRB would give increased weight
to union and third party settlements and recognize that its many efficiency factors are redundant, amounting to no more than a single factor-employer preference-its decisions might at least be more consistent with the Impartial Board's decisions.
Because of the obvious opportunity for forum shopping, consistency is very important. If the Board in practice almost always gives
effect to employer preference, only a foolish employer would agree

126. Compare Laborers Local 712, 197 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (May 26, 1972) (Board
rejects prior interunion jurisdictional agreement), with Brick Layers Local 15, 181
N.L.R.B. 1092, 1093-94 (1970) (Board emphasizes importance of interunion agreement). The Board has hastily dismissed prior agreements as ambiguous. Local 432,
Teamsters, 171 N.L.R.B. 991 (1968) (clause in contract not "clear-cut"). Recently,
it rejected an interunion agreement on the grounds that employer practice outweighed
the interunion division. Local 150, Operating Eng'rs, 197 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (June 15,
1972).
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to settle the dispute outside the administrative process.' 2 7 Moreover,
unions who fare better before the NLRB than before the Impartial
Board will tend to reduce their support for that body. Thus, the
Board's substantive emphasis on employer preference may ultimately

result in the elimination of a congressionally favored private path that
was meant to save administrative time and effort. 2 8 Conversely, if
the Board gave very heavy weight to private awards regardless of
the employer's or the defaulting union's current nonparticipation, the
parties would probably find it in their best interest to participate fully in
the private litigation. This increased participation would both strength-

en the private machinery and help remove a time-consuming administrative process.
Another important procedural aspect of the NLRB's substantive

policy is its almost unconscionable delay.' 29 In resolving jurisdictional
disputes speed is essential.

In rapidly moving businesses like the con-

struction industry, a job can be completed in six months.

Yet the

Board often takes up to nine months to adjudicate a dispute, and if
the losing party resists, Board resolution may take another year, and

court review still another year. When delay can moot a dispute, precision should yield to rapidity. 3 0

In stark contrast to the NLRB, the

127. Kelly, New National Joint Board, the First 100 Days, 47 CONSTRUCTOR,
Sept. 1965, at 22, 23-24.
128. The Associated General Contractors, an early supporter of the National Joint
Board, refused to renew the Plan when it expired in September 1969. AFL-CIO News,
Oct. 11, 1969, at 19, col. 1. This refusal resulted in a temporary limbo with no substantial management support remaining for the Plan. Nonetheless, an Interim Joint
Board continued to operate for the remainder of the year. In April 1970 some minimal employer support was discovered, and the new Joint Board was organized. In
April 1971, the Joint Board was given new life when the National Constructors Association subscribed to the Plan and agreed to urge its thirty-four members to do likewise.
Certain provisions were amended, particularly those providing for sanctions against offending unions. Washington Post, Feb. 15, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 4. On June 1, 1973,
the Building and Construction Trades Department and numerous employer associations
made substantial structural revisions in the settlement process and renamed the Joint
Board the Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes Board. The Plan for the Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes Board requires, in light of the revisions, that employers who have
signed stipulations agreeing to be bound by the Plan, but who "Were not parties to
the predecessor Plan for Settling Jursidictional Disputes of April 3, 1970, must reaffirm
their agreement in order to be accepted in this Plan." Plan, supra note 50, at art.
I(a).
129. Hearings on Taft-Hartley Revision Before the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2329 (1947).
The median delay from charge to decision was:
1968
173 days
1969
206 days
1970
230 days
130. O'Donoghue,supra note 1,at 330-31.
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Impartial Board shares with its predecessor, the Joint Board, a reputation for solving disputes with minimal delay. The Joint Board often
rendered a decision within a week after hearing a case. 1' 1 By contrast, in 1970 the median NLRB delay from charge to decision was
230 days. As long as it remains consistent with the Administrative
Procedure Act, the labor Board should emulate some of the streamlined practices of the Impartial Board.
IV.

Jurisdictional Elements

The Board has jurisdiction to hold a section 10(k) hearing only
if an employee dispute meets the jurisdictional prerequisites of
probable cause to believe that 8(b)(4)(D) is being violated. The
Board and courts have sought to inject meaning into thei statutory
words. Ultimately, the courts must define the outer limits of the
Board's jurisdiction, but since work assignment disputes involve a twostep enforcement procedure with a possibility for outside settlement,
they have given the Board much discretion. Unfortunately, the courts
in exercising their supervisory function have not curbed the Board's
tendency to assume jurisdiction over disputes, even though Congress
has enunciated a clear policy in favor of encouraging parties to settle
their disputes outside the Board's jurisdiction.
A.

ProscribedObject

The NLRB does not have section 10(k) jurisdiction over a
dispute between two groups of employees unless there is a viable
8(b)(4)(D) charge, which means that the object of that dispute must
be a particular work assignment. 1 2 The Board has rejected the
argument that it was bound by a district court's finding that such was
The fact
not the object and consequent denial of 10() injunction.'
that a court with another goal in mind might in the exercise of its

131. ABA CoM~rrrEB REPORTS, supra note 80, at 452, 458.
132. For a number of years the Board held that it was not necessary that the group
to which the work had been assigned in fact lay claim to the work. The assignment
by the employer and a claim by a competing group was sufficient for a § 8(b) (4) (D)
violation. See, e.g., Local 450, IUOE, 115 N.L.R.B. 964, 968 (1956). In CBS, however, the Supreme Court described a jurisdictional dispute as one existing between "two
or more groups of employees." NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, Local
1212, 364 U.S. 573, 579 (1961). Taking this as a cue, the Board reversed its policy
and held that a dispute cognizable under the statute must involve two or more groups
of employees demanding the work in question.
133. Pipe Trades Dist. Council No. 16, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 182 (Sept. 8, 1972).
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broad equitable powers find reasonable grounds to believe that 8(b)
(4)(D) had been violated has no binding impact on the Board.
To avoid section 10(k), a union will frequently assert that it
pickets to inform the public, to enforce its contract rights, or to protest unfair labor practices. 134 In those instances the Board must be
alert to disguised work assignment pressure, since the distinction between work assignment disputes and representational disputes is particularly hazy.' 35 While work assignment disputes involve the practical
question of which identifiable group of employees should perform a

particular task, representational disputes traditionally turn on the question of which union has the statutory right to represent a particular
group of employees. 8 6 At the extremes these are quite different
questions, but in many cases the "controversy between two unions can
. . . be cast . . . in terms of who gets the men or who gets the
work."' 1 7 While the statute regulates both kinds of dispute, the Board

only has section 10(k) jurisdiction over work assignment disputes.

38

Prior to 1970 the Board appeared eager to find a motivation for
a dispute other than work assignment. In Transport Workers 3 9 an
employer discharged a contractor and assigned the work formerly done
by the contractor's employees to his own employees. The Board upheld the displaced union's picketing as pressure to continue the em-

ployment relationship, rather than pressure to force a particular work
assignment.

Under the principle enunciated in Transport Workers,

any time an employer alters an historical work assignment he will
receive no protection from picketing by the displaced employee
134. Sheet Metal Workers Local 420, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (Sept. 6, 1972) (informational); Carpenters Local 1229, 194 N.L.R.B. 640 (1972) (unfair labor practices);
District Council No. 9, Bhd. of Painters, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (June 8, 1970) (enforcement of contract rights).
135. Compare Lithographers & Photoengravers Local 24-P, 185 N.L.R.B. 464
(1970), with Local 294, Teamsters, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (July 10, 1972).
136. Harris, The National Labor Relations Board and Arbitration, 16 SYRA. L. REV.
545, 560-61 (1965); O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 316-17; Note, Work Assignment
Disputes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 1150 (1960).
137. Note, The N.L.R.B. and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191, 1199
(1968).
138. An assignment to the organized group has the awkward effect of granting de
facto certification. To resist the assignment determined by 10(k), the employer must
face an unrestricted strike and picketing. To assign the work according to the award
might force unionization of the employees performing the work without testing their
desires for representation. Perhaps when one group is unorganized, it would be best
to abstain from exercising 10(k) jurisdiction and resolve the dispute under the representation procedures found in § 8(b) (7) (C) and § 9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (7) (C)
& 159 (1970).
139. 186 N.L.R.B. 538 (1970).
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group. While this policy might be socially and economically wise in
the long run, 14 0 it is hardly consistent with the statutory command that
the Board "hear and determine" work assignment disputes. By holding that the incumbent union in Transport Workers had a right to protect its work by economic pressure over employer objection, the
Board violated the policy underlying section 8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k)
that favors resolving disputes with strong jurisdictional overtones. In
District Council No. 9, Brotherhood of Painters141 the picketing union
alleged that the employer had failed to make contributions to an industry insurance fund as required by the collective bargaining contract.
When union members walked off the job to protest this contract violation the employer subcontracted their work to a relative's corporation
that employed members of a different union. The complaining union
asserted that its picketing sought to enforce compliance with the contract, not to dispute assignment of the work to another union. The
Board held that this dispute did not come within its 10(k)-8(b)(4)
(D) jurisdiction. Like Transport Workers, this holding potentially
could lead to Board avoidance of many true work-assignment disputes.
The Board has long indicated that a contractual claim to disputed work
is a factor in resolving work assignment disputes, 1 42 but this decision
makes the contractual claim a determinative preliminary element.
With a bit of jurisdictional boilerplate in the collective bargaining contract, a union could strike to enforce jurisdictional claims under the
guise of a contractual dispute, thus avoiding the policies behind section
8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k).
Fortunately, since 1970 the Board has made a quiet but dramatic
shift in its position. The Board now is much less willing to quash a
10(k) hearing on the ground that a nonproscribed object motivated
the union pressure.143 It has recognized that the work assignment
140. Sussman suggests that tradition and preservation of the status quo are prime
factors to be used in determining the proper assignment of work pursuant to a 10(k)
hearing. Sussman, supra note 1, at 223.
141.

183 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (June 8, 1970).

142. E.g., Glaziers' Local 1778, 137 N.L.R.B. 975 (1962).
143. The Board has indicated that a dispute precipitated by an employer removing
work from one group of employees and assigning it to another has sufficient work assignment overtones for § 10(k) resolution. Newspaper Guild Local 1, 191 N.L.R.B.
236 (1971). It has rejected a dual allegation that picketing was to protect union pay
scales or at most "to organize the employer" as grounds for quashing a § 10(k) hearing.

Teamsters Local 294, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (July 10, 1972).

Similarly, the Board

has not favorably viewed claims that the dispute is representational.
ing Pressmen, 201 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (Jan. 15, 1973).

Local 531, Print-

In light of evidence indicating

that the two bases of "dispute" concerned work assignment the Board has even rejected
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need not necessarily be the sole motive for a union's pressure, and
it has realized that it should not resolve difficult factual issues on
union motivation prior to the 10(k) hearing. The Regional Director
need only be reasonably satisfied that an object of the union pressure
is work assignment.
At this first stage of the two-step work assignment procedure the
Board should err on the side of overinclusion. After it makes its
10(k) award the losing organization can continue to exert pressure
and defend an 8(b)(4)(D) complaint. In the context of an unfair
labor practice proceeding the union can once again present its
evidence of motivation. If, after the hearing and findings of the administrative law judge, the Board finds that the union sought ends
other than work assignment, it can dismiss the complaint and allow
the union to continue its economic battle. Critics of the Board's new
approach may argue that in the interest of administrative efficiency
the Board should try to avoid bifurcating the procedure and decide
as many issues as possible with a single order. Although this policy
is sound, by prematurely narrowing its jurisdiction the Board may deprive employers or competing employees of their administrative day
in court. The premature dismissal also discourages the parties from
settling their disputes privately.
B.

Partiesto the Dispute

Section 10(k) provides that the NLRB lacks jurisdiction to hear
and determine a dispute giving rise to an 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor
practice claim if there is satisfactory evidence that the "parties to such
dispute" have either adjusted their dispute or agreed on a method for
its voluntary adjustment. While the competing employee groups are
always parties to the dispute, some controversy has arisen over
whether and when the phrase refers to employers. If the competing
employee groups actually settle their dispute, and one group renounces
its claim to the work, then the employer can no longer be considered
a party for the simple reason that there is no longer a jurisdictional
dispute.144 Under those circumstances the Board must quash the
10(k) hearing and dismiss the 8(b)(4)(D) charge regardless of employer participation in or acceptance of settlement. When the com-

the argument that picketing was motivated by the employer's alleged unfair labor practices. Carpenters Local 1229, 194 N.L.R.B. 640 (1972).
144. Brief for the NLRB at 13, NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971).

453
HeinOnline -- 52 Tex. L. Rev. 453 1973-1974

Texas Law Review

Vol. 52:417, 1974

peting employees have merely agreed on a method of settlement, however, the Board interprets the term "parties" to include the employer
as well as the employee groups. 145 It will not quash the 10(k) hearing, therefore, unless the employer has agreed to the private settlement method. The Board argues that the phrase "such disputes" in
section 10(k) refers to the 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice dispute,
to which the employer is a party, and not merely to the underlying
jurisdictional dispute between the competing labor groups.140 Since
the facts that give rise to an 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice dispute
are invariably the same facts on which the Board bases its section
10(k) resolution, the Board argues that the employer must be a party
to that hearing as well. Moreover, the Board claims that the employer's
substantial economic interest in the outcome of a section 10(k) hearing will make him less likely to accept jurisdictional resolutions to
which he was not a party.
Recently the D.C. Circuit had an opportunity to consider the
Board's reasoning. In Plasterers'Local 79 v. NLRB 4 7 two unions, the
Plasterers and the Tile Setters, claimed jurisdiction over the task of
applying cement to the walls of a building under construction. Both
unions but not the employer agreed to submit the dispute to the Joint
Board, which rendered a decision in favor of the Plasterers. When
the Tile Setters refused to relinquish the work, and the employer
refused to assign the job to the Plasterers, the Plasterers went on strike.
Shortly thereafter the employer filed an 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor
practice charge. In the ensuing 10(k) hearing the Board determined
that the disputed work should go to the Tile Setters. Asserting that
the disputing employee groups had agreed to a method of private settlement under section 10(k), the Plasterers refused to accept the NLRB's
determination and continued their strike. The employer then pressed
its 8(b)(4)(D) complaint and the Board determined that the Plasterers' actions constituted an unfair labor practice.
On review, the D.C. Circuit reversed the Board, holding that the
145. See, e.g., Typographical Union No. 17 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 755, 763 (5th Cir.
1966) (employer did not voluntarily submit to arbitration); NLRB v. Local 825,
IOE, 326 F.2d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 1964) (employer did not agree to be bound by
the Joint Board's decision); Local 450, IlUOE v. Elliot, 256 F.2d 630, 636 (5th Cir.
1958) (employer manifested only a desire to settle the dispute).
146. Brief for the NLRB at 12, NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
147. 440 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 116 (1971), noted in 71
CoLum. L. REv. 724 (1971). See Comment, The Employer as a Necessary Party to,
Voluntary Settlement of Work Assignment Disputes Under Section 10(k) of the
NLRA, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 389 (1971).
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employee groups' agreement to submit their jurisdictional dispute to
binding arbitration deprived the NLRB of authority to settle the matter
under section 10(k).148 The court's position was thus exactly the opposite of the Board's. It felt that 10(k)'s use of the term "dispute"
referred only to the underlying jurisdictional dislute, not to the dispute
between the employer and the striking union. Accordingly, it interpreted the phrase "parties to such dispute" to refer only to the employee parties and thus found their agreement to methods of settlement sufficient to oust the Board of jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
employer's failure to agree.
In reaching its decision the court relied on dictum in CBS to the
effect that disputes under section 8(b)(4)(D) arise "between two or
more groups of employees" and that employers are "helpless victims
of quarrels that do not concern them at all.' 1 49 It also found persuasive evidence in the legislative history that section 10(k)'s real goal
was the resolution of disputes between competing unions. The court
felt that Congress was concerned primarily with .the insoluble dilemma of the employer who faced a strike no matter which work assignment he made. Thus, only if the unions themselves had no method
for privately resolving the dispute did Congress intend for the Government to intervene and rescue the besieged neutral employer.
Furthermore, the court's opinion clearly indicated that an employer
who refuses to accept a private settlement between competing unions
would do so only for economic reasons. Thus, rather than a besieged
neutral in a jurisdictional dispute, the employer who refuses to accept
a private settlement becomes a party to an economic dispute, and section 10(k) and 8(b)(4)(D) are not vehicles for the resolution of economic disputes.
The D.C. Circuit also noted the incongruity of the Board's argument that an actual settlement of the dispute by the competing unions,
without employer consent, disposed of the 8(b)(4)(D) complaint, but
that an agreement to arbitrate the dispute required employer consent.
The court could find little conceptual basis for the distinction that
would eliminate the need for employer participation in the first situation but require it in the second. Indeed, only bad timing or bad faith
on the part of the losing union could keep the agreed-upon method
from producing an actual settlement. Finally, the court stressed that
148. 440 F.2d at 180.

149. NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 364 U.S. 573, 579, 581 (1961).
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the purported distinction could not contribute to industrial stability.
To allow a union that has lost in the private determination ready access
to a second chance before the Board is at best wasteful and time-consuming; at worst, it is a breeding ground for prolonged and intense
litigation. The court thus held that, since the disputing unions had
agreed on a method of settlement, the Board had no section 10(k)
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute independently. Accordingly, the
court held that the Plasterers' picketing did not violate 8(b)(4)(D).
In NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79150 the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the D.C. Circuit. Asserting that section 10(k)'s
language and legislative history were inconclusive, the Court adopted
the Board's reasoning virtually in its entirety. The Court, however,
failed to respond satisfactorily to some of the basic premises of the
lower court's decision. First, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the
employer's substantial economic interest in the outcome of the jurisdictional dispute, thus supporting rather than undercutting the circuit
court's rationale. 51 Since, by the terms of the Court's own argument,
the employer's interest is economic, his dispute with the union that
prevailed at the private determination would almost necessarily be
economic as well, and thus, as the lower court argued, beyond the
reach of 10(k) and 8(b)(4)(D).
Moreover, since the beneficiary
of a private award is the only party who can present a valid demand
for the work, the D.C. Circuit's approach fully protects the employer
from the dilemma of two competing claims from two potentially valid
claimants. If the employer follows the private award he will receive
full 8(b)(4)(D) protection against pressure from the losing union. If
in pursuing his economic self-interest he elects to reject the private
award, he should not be in a position to insist that the NLRB resolve
for a second time a dispute that the unions themselves have legally
if not factually resolved already. Therefore, the Supreme Court's approach is unnecessary for satisfactorily protecting an employer whose
interest is not economic. Moreover, under the Supreme Court's analysis a union that dishonors its contractual obligation to follow a private
settlement may well benefit from its illegal conduct-a strange policy
for the Court to promote.
The Court never satisfactorily explained why the employer's economic interest in the outcome of a jurisdictional dispute justifies requiring
150. 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
151. For a discussion of the nature of the employer's economic interests see Comment, supra note 147, at 440-41.
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his assent to an agreement on methods of settlement, but does not
justify employer input into the labor parties' actual settlement. The
Court responded that actual settlement removes the necessity for
10(k) resolution. 1 52 Yet if the employer's economic interest in the dispute makes him a necessary party to the procedures for resolving it,
that interest should also require his representation in any final settlement. In reality, the Court simply disagreed with Congress' policy
of encouraging competing employee groups to resolve their own disputes. By refusing to demand the employer's presence at any actual
settlement, Congress was implementing its general policy of allowing
labor and management to use limited economic force to resolve their
economic disputes. By demanding that the employer participate in
a settlement procedure that one of the unions subsequently ignores,
the Court indicated its disagreement with the congressional policy.
The Board and the Court were justifiably concerned that the
unions might exclude the employer from private dispute-resolving
machinery and thereby ignore valid employer interests.1 53 But that
problem does not necessarily dictate the Supreme Court's result.
When the private machinery gives the employer access and considers
his valid interests, actual employer participation should not be necessary to a binding private award. If the unions establish procedures
that affirmatively exclude employers or patently disregard valid employer interests, the NLRB should hold that the parties have not
agreed to a private settlement method and should resolve the dispute
pursuant to section 10(k). But if the employer elects to forego participation in a private settlement procedure that promises to weigh his
interests, then its results should be as binding on him as they are on
the participating employee groups.
Read narrowly, Plasterers need not preclude the Board from
adopting this course of action. Plasterersdecided only that the NLRB
may hold a 10(k) hearing to determine a jurisdictional dispute when
the competing unions but not the employer agree on a settlement
method; the Court did not decide that it must hold one. 5 4 Given
152. The Court reasoned that "an employer may be a third party to disputes over
work assignments, but when the other two parties settle their differences and one union
declines the work assigned to it, the inter-union conflict that §§ 8(b)(4)(D) and
10(k) were designed to eliminate disappears." 404 U.S. at 134-35.
153. One commentator suggested that the resolution of the employer's important
economic interest in the outcome of the work assignment dispute without guaranteeing
his right to full participation would violate his constitutional right to procedural due
process. Comment, supra note 147, at 401.
154. The Court stated that "the LMRA requires that the Board defer only when
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the Court's obvious concern for the employer's interests, it would probably be an unreasonable exercise of discretion for the Board to defer
to private machinery that affirmatively excluded the employer or
failed to weigh his interests appropriately. 15 The Board, however,
could still defer to impartial private settlement procedures that recognize the employer's stake and allow him to present his case.
This policy would be beneficial in three respects. First, it would
prevent unions that agree to arbitration from later contending that
employer nonparticipation invalidated their agreement and attempting
to use the Board as a second forum in which to relitigate an undesirable private decision. Second, by deferring to private machinery, the
Board would both relieve itself of an unnecessary part of its caseload
and prevent employers from using 8(b)(4)(D) to settle essentially
economic disputes. Finally, if the NLRB will defer to private resolution, employers would necessarily participate in that process, strengthening both the machinery and the decision.
C.

"Agreed'

Even when the definition of "parties" is not in dispute, the Board
generally appears unwilling to find that the parties have agreed on a
method of settlement. The party relying on an agreed settlement
method must carry the burden of proving the existence of an agreement, and the Board will resolve any vagueness or ambiguity against
agreement.15 6 Long ago the Board wisely held that when the parties
had contractually bound themselves to a settlement method, the
Board lost its 10(k) jurisdiction.1 57 Moreover, the Board held that
it would not give effect to a union's unilateral renunciation of a private settlement by independently resolving the dispute under section
10(k). x' s Yet under its rule that the employer is a necessary party
all of the parties have agreed on a method of settlement .... " 404 U.S. at 137.
While the Court did hold that an employer is a party to the dispute and must be a
party to an agreement on settlement methods, it remains arguable that Plasterers does
not prevent the Board from adopting a doctrine of constructive employer agreement
when settlement methods both recognize his interest and allow him to participate. If
under those circumstances the employer elects not to participate in the private arbitration, the Board could treat him as having tacitly agreed to the result reached without
his participation.
155. The Court specifically objected to forcing employer agreement to private methods on the ground that those private methods might disregard his interests. 404 U.S.
at 132.
156. See Sheetmetal Workers Local 89, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 110 (Aug. 3, 1972).
157. Carpenters Local 943, 96 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1951).
158. Millwrights Local 1102, 121 N.L.R.B. 101, 106-07 (1958). Contra, Mill-
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to the settlement procedure, the Board has been distressingly reluctant
to find employer agreement to private settlement methods. In
Operating Engineers Local 701119 the parent company had agreed to
submit work-assignment disputes to the Joint Board. The Board held

that since its subsidiary had made no such agreement, the private determination would not bind the subsidiary. The corporate parent's
agreement was insufficient to deprive the Board of its superseding
10(k) power to resolve the dispute. In Laborers Local 663160 the
Board went one step further and distinguished between two arms of
the same corporation. The Board has held that a prime contractor's
agreement does not bind a subcontractor on the same project, 1" and
an agreement between an employer and a union at one job does not
bind the same parties at another job. 162 To the extent that Congress
desired private dispute settlement, this strict attitude defeats that policy. The Board should adopt the flexible approach it uses under the
statute's secondary boycott provisions or the policies that bind subcontractors to affirmative action minority hiring under government contracts. 63 The Board should concern itself with the purposes behind

the statute rather than its literal language, disregard corporate entities,
and apply the statute to reach the goals that Congress envisioned.1 64
Under this analogy the Board could reasonably interpret a primary
contractor's contract to bind all his subcontractors who are aware of

wrights Local 1862, 184 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (July 15, 1970). The Board has also held
that the parties to the dispute do not have to agree personally to the private method
of settlement to be bound thereby. On the union side, when an international accepts
the private dispute-resolving machinery, even though the disputing local never expressly
agreed to the method, the local is nonetheless bound because of the international's constitutional authority to bind it. Laborers Local 670, 189 N.L.R.B. 715 (1971). On
the employer side, even absent consent of the individual members, an association, multiemployer bargaining unit, or other horizontal amalgamation may bind its members to
the private machinery. Operating Eng'rs Local 571, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 182 (June 6,
1973).
159. 182 N.L.R.B. 77 (1970).
160. 181 N.L.R.B. 380 (1970).
161. Laborers Local 42, 182 N.L.R.B. 862, 864 (1970).
162. Ironworkers Local 563, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 112 (June 25, 1970). An employer
may also have separate contracts with the competing labor groups, and each of these
contracts may provide for submission of the dispute to private resolution. Nonetheless,
the Board has indicated that separate and distinguishable agreements with competing
groups is not sufficient. Apparently, there must be a single tripartite agreement, or
the agreements must be so similar in their requirements that they can be viewed in pan
materia. Stereotypers Union, 301 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (Jan. 15, 1973).
163. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. § 173 (1973). See also 41 C.F.R. § 60 et
seq. (1973).
164. See Electrical Workers Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); Building
& Constr. Trades Council, 155 N.L.R.B. 319 (1965).
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his settlement agreements. The Board should encourage congressionally favored private settlement by refusing artificially to limit an
employer's settlement agreement to a particular job, operating arm,
or corporate entity.
In addition to its strict stance on multiple entities, the Board has
not been liberal in finding that an individual employer had acquiesced
in a particular private settlement. When an employer accepts the
working conditions or benefits of a previously existing contract, the
Board has held that he is not bound to a clause in the older contract
requiring submission of disputes to private settlement. 6 5 Moreover,
the employer's informing the Joint Board of the facts of an interunion
dispute does not bind him to the Joint Board's resolution. 166 The
Board has even held that when an employer requests the disputing
unions to utilize the private machinery, he does not thereby agree to
accept the outcome of the private procedure. 67 This hard-line stance
combined with the Supreme Court's Plasterers requirement that the
employer agree to the private method of settlement means that a union
that prevails at the private settlement has virtually no way of enforcing
that award.
Until recently, the Board could reply that this result is not inequitable, since a union with enough economic strength can compel the
employer to accept a third party settlement provision in their collective
bargaining agreement. Consistent with this position, the Board has
held that a union may insist to impasse that the employer agree to
the clause and then strike to enforce the demand. 68 The Seventh
Circuit in Associated General Contractors v. NLRB, 69 however, has
undercut this position. The court held that a union's insistence to impasse on a clause requiring an employer to submit disputes to the
National Joint Board was coercion of the employer in the selection
of his representatives, which violated section 8(b)(1)(B). 7 0 The
court insisted that work assignment disputes were grievances, and it
165. Cf. Ironworkers Local 6, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 178 (May 22, 1972).
166. Ironworkers Local 272, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 178 (May 31, 1973).
167. Plumbers Local 149, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (Aug. 18, 1972) (employer stated
he would abide by the two unions' decision).
168. Ironworkers Local 103, 190 N.L.R.B. 741, 742 (1971) (provided the union enter negotiations with an open mind).
169. 465 F.2d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1972).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B) (1970). This section provides in part: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . . (1) to restrain or coerce . . .
(B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. .... "
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rejected the Board's arguments that the Joint Board was not a representative of the employer. The court also noted that the Joint Board's
neutrality did not prevent application of the literal provisions of
8(b)(1)(B). The Board also argued to no avail that negotiating for
a settlement clause is little different from bargaining for a more typical grievance arbitration clause. Although the court vaguely hinted
that negotiation for a settlement provision is not a mandatory subject
for bargaining, it expressly refused to reach the issue. Thus, section
8(b)(l)(B) apparently does not prohibit mere negotiation between
the parties for a settlement clause. Since the court was primarily concerned with a union's forcing an employer to accept dispute resolutions
of a body that the employer had no role in selecting, the decision
should not be held to prohibit a union's use of economio pressure
against an employer in an effort to compel him to accept a work
assignment settlement clause that provides for employer participation
in the selection of the settling body. 17 1
D.

Method of Settlement

Even when all the parties have agreed to procedures for resolving
their work assignment disputes, the Board has indicated that it will
examine the method of settlement to determine whether it can effectively resolve the dispute. If the Board concludes that the private machinery will not end the dispute, it will continue to exercise its 10(k)
jurisdiction. In Millwrights Local 1862172 all the parties, including the
employer, had agreed to submit work assignment disputes to the Joint
Board. One of the unions, however, indicated that it did not intend
to be bound by a Joint Board award and refused to participate in the
proceedings. Notwithstanding the Joint Board proceedings, the
NLRB heard the dispute and awarded the work to the repudiating party. Over the dissent of Member Fanning, the Board distinguished this
situation from past cases holding that a party could not repudiate a

171. The revised Plan for the Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes Board has similar
prohibitions against use of coercion. Although negotiation for acceptance is encouraged, the Plan provides:
The essence of this Plan assumes voluntary participation ....
ENo contractor stipulation or agreement shall be recognized by the Impartial
Jurisdictional Disputes Board if it is shown to the satisfaction of this Board
that it is the result of unlawful strikes, work stoppages or other coercive activity or any activity which is contrary to the voluntary nature of this Plan
Plan, supra note 50, at art. I(a).
172. 184 N.LR.B. No. 58 (July 15, 1970).
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Joint Board award if it had actually participated in the proceedings." '
Yet once a party has contractually bound itself to accept a private procedure, the Board should not allow him to withdraw from that obligation. His agreement to submit the dispute is probably subject to judicial enforcement, and the Board should not give it any less importance
than a court. 7 4 His conduct is no less a breach of an agreement because he repudiated it before rather than after the Joint Board decision. Fortunately, recent cases indicate that the Board has abandoned
75
its illogical distinction.
The Board also rested its Millwrights Local holding on the Joint
Board's lack of enforcement power. It indicated that after the initial
award the Joint Board was in a temporary hiatus, because the withdrawing party had no opportunity for appellate review with the private
proceedings. 1 76 Because of this hiatus the Joint Board lacked its normal enforcement powers. The Joint Board's inability to compel compliance made it an unacceptable method of settlement in the eyes of
the NLRB. The recent case of Boile'rmakers Local 74177 reflects this
theme. In that case an agreement provided for employer-union discussion of grievances with a "goal" of resolution. The Board held that
negotiation with a goal was not a method of settlement within the
meaning of section 10(k). Yet Boilermakers Local is clearly distinguishable from Millwrights Local. In Millwrights the Joint Board
made an award, but lacked independent enforcement power; in
Boilermakers there was no award and no assurance that the proscribed
procedure would have resulted in an award. In Teamsters Local
627,178 the Board may have retreated from its Boilermakers stand.
The Board there examined an agreement between an employer and
a union, stating that the parties would discuss any problems. If they
were unable to resolve the dispute, the agreement provided that they
would submit it to the parent unions who, with the employer, would
settle the dispute. Since the agreement did not provide for a binding
third party resolution, apparently the parties were to resolve their dis173. E.g., Millwrights Local 1102, 121 N.L.R.B. 101, 106-07 (1958).
174. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Although there
is authority that the courts will not entertain § 301 suits contrary to a 10(k) award
by the Board, there is little indication that the courts would not entertain a § 301 suit
to force a party to arbitration when the contract so required. Cf. New York Mailers'
Union 6 v. New York Times Co., 32 Misc. 2d 60, 222 N.Y.S. 2d 1000 (1961).

175.
176.
177.
178.

See, e.g., Laborers Local 670, 189 N.L.R.B. 715 (1971).
The new Impartial Board procedure eliminates the lack of appeal problem.
198 N.L.R.B. No. 147 (Aug. 21, 1972).
195 N.L.R.B. 93, 94 (1972).
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putes through tripartite negotiations. Although this method was nothing more than "negotiations with a goal," the NLRB held that it was
a method of settlement within section 1O(k)'s scope.
The Board in Laborers Local 423179 has indicated a possible solution to the proper method of settlement problem. According to Joint
Board procedures, a union that does not comply with Joint Board rules
or orders cannot obtain a favorable Joint Board award in future cases.
Member Kennedy argued that when a union that has not complied
with a past Joint Board order contracts to be bound by Joint Board

procedures, it has not agreed to a method of settlement, because the
Joint Board cannot effectively settle its future disputes. A majority of
the Board, however, emphasizing that the parties had all agreed to
the Joint Board procedures, held that the NLRB did have jurisdiction
to resolve the dispute. The Board was correct in emphasizing the
agreement aspect of the statute. If the parties have only agreed to
nonbinding discussion of a dispute that may never actually reach a definitive award, they have in reality agreed to nothing. But if the parties
have agreed to a procedure that will produce a judicially enforceable
award, the Board should not exercise its 10(k) jurisdiction. Since no
arbitrator or court has the personal power to enforce sanctions or compel compliance with its decisions, the private machinery's lack of enforcement power should be irrelevant. Since the Board under section
8(b)(4)(D) or the courts under section 301 can enforce private
awards, the Millwrights Local decision was clearly wrong in requiring
internal enforcement methods. The Board in Laborers Local 423,
however, was correct in holding that the binding nature of the private
award is not fatally deficient simply because the resolution machinery
refuses to award work to a party that is in contempt of that machinery.
The parties have agreed in advance to accept that sanction. They
should not be allowed to profit from contumacious disregard of their
contractual obligations. As long as the agreement authorizes a binding award, the Board should require no more than that the method
afford fundamentally fair procedures and accord with the basic policies
of the Act.'

179. 199 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (Sept. 29, 1972); see Operating Eng'rs Local 571, 203
N.L.R.B. No. 182 (June 6, 1973) (Kennedy, dissenting).
180. See Speilberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). The Board might
well demand that employers as well as competing unions be allowed to participate, and
that the decisionmaker be fundamentally neutral. The Board might also demand that
all relevant factors be considered by the private tribunal.
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V. Conclusion
In section 10(k) Congress implemented its laudable policy of
keeping government out of labor disputes as much as possible. That
section encourages the parties to agree in advance on ways to resolve
work assignment disputes. Only when the private methods fail did
Congress intend for the Government to step in and resolve the dispute.18 1 Labor has responded to section 10(k) by establishing a fair
and speedy process that represents the interests of all the parties who
agree to be bound. The NLRB, on the other hand, provides a cumbersome procedure that almost invariably results in an award that conforms to employer preference. The Board's substantive stance, of
course, encourages employers to seek out the Board whenever possible. The Board, supported by the Supreme Court's decision in
Plasterers,accommodates the employer's urge to forum shop by vigorously asserting its 10(k) jurisdiction whenever the employer has not
agreed to a private method of settlement. Moreover, it is quite reluctant to find employer agreement even where evidence indicates that
the employer has in fact tacitly agreed to the private settlement; the
Board analyzes employer acceptance with the strictness of common law
pleadings in search of personally binding commitments. This current
trend runs counter to the congressional policy of encouraging private
settlement and discouraging delay. The Board should be more willing
to find employer agreement to the private method. Moreover, it
181. Cf. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Teamsters Local 70,
198 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (July 31, 1972); Radioear Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 137 (Oct.
30, 1972). These cases of Board deferral involved allegations of a refusal to bargain
in violation of § 8(a) (5) or § 8(b) (3) of the Act. Their resolution would, of necessity, require interpretation of existing contract provisions between the parties. The
Board believed that those disputes could best be resolved by the grievance arbitration
provisions of these contracts and thus deferred to that process without itself interpreting
the contracts and resolving the complaints under the statute. The courts have also favored a policy of deferral to private processes. See, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
Some cases illustrate a Board predilection to defer to grievance arbitration even
when interpretation of the collective bargaining contract is not a prerequisite to a determination of statutory rights. E.g., National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (July 31,
1972). The Board will defer to grievance arbitration machinery when an employee alleges that he has been the victim of discrimination proscribed by § 8(a) (3) of the Act,
and the contract proscribes discriminatory discharges. This policy is a step beyond
Collyer Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). In Collyer Wire only group interests were
involved. Here, an individual's statutory rights were being resolved by a private tribunal, rights the Board could have easily resolved without interpreting the collective
bargaining contract. The arbitrator will thus not only interpret, perhaps indirectly,
statutory terms, but will necessarily have to resolve the technical, difficult, and highly
charged issue of motivation. See also Beaird & Player, Whither the Nixon Board?, 7
GEoRGru L. Rlv. 607, 627-39 (1973).
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should realign itself with congressional intent by exercising its option
to defer to private settlement procedures that allow employer participation, maintain neutrality in their composition, apply standards that
recognize employer interests and are not inconsistent with fundamental
labor policy.
If the Board refuses to act, Congress could remedy the situation
by allowing the administrative law judge actually to resolve disputes.
These judges are men with experience and ability who can view the
working place, observe the workers, determine credibility, and ask
important questions. They are in a better position to decide disputes
accurately than the distant Board. Giving the administrative law
judge the power of resolution would be an ideal compromise between a purely private arbitrator and the Board. The Board could
periodically decide important cases to provide the administrative law
judges with the relevant factors and analysis. The Board, of course,
should exercise certiorari-type review in extraordinary cases when it
desires to make major policy pronouncements. A more drastic solution would be for Congress to repeal section 10(k). This change
would mean that 8(b)(4)(D) standing unadorned would prohibit any
union pressure against an employer assignment. While this prohibition would run against the current congressional policy of providing
a forum for settling jurisdictional disputes, the result would not differ
substantially from the current Board practice of affirming employer
awards in 10(k) proceedings.
If the Board can modify its procedures to provide rapid settlement of work assignment disputes with a minimum cost in agency time
and effort, private settlement machinery will perhaps become unnecessary. But if the Board continues its time-consuming course, which
discourages employers from supporting private awards, the private
machinery ironically will disappear when the need for it is greatest.
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